Regulation by Public Options: Evidence from Pension Funds
Resumen:
We study the equilibrium welfare effects of using state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to regulate market power. We estimate a dynamic equilibrium model of Uruguay’s individual capitalization pension system, where a high-quality SOE competes with private firms. We find that the presence of an SOE reduces equilibrium fees and increases investment returns. Eliminating the SOE and replacing it with a private firm would more than double its fee and increase the fees of private firms by 8\%. Reducing workers' inertia cannot fully offset privatization. Finally, direct price regulation outperforms SOE as a competitive force in the market.
| 2025 | |
| Agencia Nacional de Investigación e Innovación | |
|
Competition State-owned firms Ciencias Sociales Economía y Negocios Organización Industrial |
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| Inglés | |
| Agencia Nacional de Investigación e Innovación | |
| REDI | |
| https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12381/5369 | |
| Acceso abierto | |
| Reconocimiento 4.0 Internacional. (CC BY) |
