The deterrence effect of linear versus convex fines: laboratory evidence
Resumen:
Using experiments in which participants play the role of pollutingfirms, we study compliance behavior with emissions limits undertwo types of fines and two different regulatory instruments. We findthat the market price of pollution permits and the probability ofviolating permits holdings are higher with a fine that is convex inthe level of violation than with one that is linear. This effect oper-ates through an increase in the prices asked by sellers, not in thebids made by the buyers of permits. We do not observe an effect ofthe type of the fine on the average level of violation or the numberof firms in violation in the case of emission standards. We concludethat the type of fines may affect the cost-effectiveness of pollutioncontrol programs based on tradable pollution permits.
| 2021 | |
|
Environmental policy Enforcement Penaltystructure Laboratory experiments |
|
| Inglés | |
| Universidad de Montevideo | |
| REDUM | |
|
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/2443
https://doi.org/10.1080/15140326.2020.1848307 |
|
| Acceso abierto | |
| Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional |
| _version_ | 1807356681318825984 |
|---|---|
| author | Caffera, Marcelo |
| author2 | Chávez, Carlos Ardente, Analía |
| author2_role | author author |
| author_facet | Caffera, Marcelo Chávez, Carlos Ardente, Analía |
| author_role | author |
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| bitstream.checksumAlgorithm.fl_str_mv | MD5 MD5 MD5 MD5 MD5 |
| bitstream.url.fl_str_mv | http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/2443/1/The_deterrence_effec_of_linear_versus_convex_fines_laboratory_evidence_Caffera.pdf http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/2443/2/license_rdf http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/2443/3/license.txt http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/2443/4/The_deterrence_effec_of_linear_versus_convex_fines_laboratory_evidence_Caffera.pdf.txt http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/2443/5/The_deterrence_effec_of_linear_versus_convex_fines_laboratory_evidence_Caffera.pdf.jpg |
| collection | REDUM |
| dc.contributor.filiacion.es.fl_str_mv | Caffera, Marcelo. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay Chávez, Carlos. Universidad de Talca, Chile Ardente, Analía. Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, Uruguay |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv | Caffera, Marcelo Chávez, Carlos Ardente, Analía |
| dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv | 2024-06-12T19:32:31Z |
| dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv | 2024-06-12T19:32:31Z |
| dc.date.issued.es.fl_str_mv | 2021 |
| dc.description.abstract.none.fl_txt_mv | Using experiments in which participants play the role of pollutingfirms, we study compliance behavior with emissions limits undertwo types of fines and two different regulatory instruments. We findthat the market price of pollution permits and the probability ofviolating permits holdings are higher with a fine that is convex inthe level of violation than with one that is linear. This effect oper-ates through an increase in the prices asked by sellers, not in thebids made by the buyers of permits. We do not observe an effect ofthe type of the fine on the average level of violation or the numberof firms in violation in the case of emission standards. We concludethat the type of fines may affect the cost-effectiveness of pollutioncontrol programs based on tradable pollution permits. |
| dc.format.extent.es.fl_str_mv | pp. 45-70 |
| dc.format.mimetype.es.fl_str_mv | application/pdf |
| dc.identifier.doi.es.fl_str_mv | https://doi.org/10.1080/15140326.2020.1848307 |
| dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/2443 |
| dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv | eng |
| dc.publisher.es.fl_str_mv | Taylor and Francis |
| dc.relation.ispartof.es.fl_str_mv | Journal of Applied Economics |
| dc.rights.es.fl_str_mv | Abierto |
| dc.rights.license.none.fl_str_mv | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional |
| dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| dc.rights.uri.*.fl_str_mv | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| dc.source.none.fl_str_mv | reponame:REDUM instname:Universidad de Montevideo instacron:Universidad de Montevideo |
| dc.subject.keyword.es.fl_str_mv | Environmental policy Enforcement Penaltystructure Laboratory experiments |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv | The deterrence effect of linear versus convex fines: laboratory evidence |
| dc.type.es.fl_str_mv | Artículo |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
| dc.type.version.es.fl_str_mv | Publicada |
| dc.type.version.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
| description | Using experiments in which participants play the role of pollutingfirms, we study compliance behavior with emissions limits undertwo types of fines and two different regulatory instruments. We findthat the market price of pollution permits and the probability ofviolating permits holdings are higher with a fine that is convex inthe level of violation than with one that is linear. This effect oper-ates through an increase in the prices asked by sellers, not in thebids made by the buyers of permits. We do not observe an effect ofthe type of the fine on the average level of violation or the numberof firms in violation in the case of emission standards. We concludethat the type of fines may affect the cost-effectiveness of pollutioncontrol programs based on tradable pollution permits. |
| eu_rights_str_mv | openAccess |
| format | article |
| id | REDUM_d3a8006ebdce283d08e0be61e79ba37d |
| instacron_str | Universidad de Montevideo |
| institution | Universidad de Montevideo |
| instname_str | Universidad de Montevideo |
| language | eng |
| network_acronym_str | REDUM |
| network_name_str | REDUM |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:redum.um.edu.uy:20.500.12806/2443 |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| reponame_str | REDUM |
| repository.mail.fl_str_mv | nolascoaga@um.edu.uy |
| repository.name.fl_str_mv | REDUM - Universidad de Montevideo |
| repository_id_str | 10501 |
| rights_invalid_str_mv | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional Abierto http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| spelling | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 InternacionalAbiertohttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess29379aa7-bd77-483a-9074-54df31de362e9b42c627-a3c8-425f-a478-23a2f0ec6700b5adafa8-6b9b-4aec-a9e6-a7e0b9f8edb8Caffera, Marcelo. Universidad de Montevideo, UruguayChávez, Carlos. Universidad de Talca, ChileArdente, Analía. Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, Uruguay2024-06-12T19:32:31Z2024-06-12T19:32:31Z2021https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/2443https://doi.org/10.1080/15140326.2020.1848307pp. 45-70application/pdfengTaylor and FrancisJournal of Applied EconomicsThe deterrence effect of linear versus convex fines: laboratory evidenceArtículoPublicadainfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleUsing experiments in which participants play the role of pollutingfirms, we study compliance behavior with emissions limits undertwo types of fines and two different regulatory instruments. We findthat the market price of pollution permits and the probability ofviolating permits holdings are higher with a fine that is convex inthe level of violation than with one that is linear. This effect oper-ates through an increase in the prices asked by sellers, not in thebids made by the buyers of permits. We do not observe an effect ofthe type of the fine on the average level of violation or the numberof firms in violation in the case of emission standards. We concludethat the type of fines may affect the cost-effectiveness of pollutioncontrol programs based on tradable pollution permits.Environmental policyEnforcementPenaltystructureLaboratory experimentsreponame:REDUMinstname:Universidad de Montevideoinstacron:Universidad de MontevideoCaffera, MarceloChávez, CarlosArdente, AnalíaORIGINALThe_deterrence_effec_of_linear_versus_convex_fines_laboratory_evidence_Caffera.pdfThe_deterrence_effec_of_linear_versus_convex_fines_laboratory_evidence_Caffera.pdfapplication/pdf1713649http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/2443/1/The_deterrence_effec_of_linear_versus_convex_fines_laboratory_evidence_Caffera.pdf80b3c9ca1543f7cb216190b53b994db9MD51CC-LICENSElicense_rdflicense_rdfapplication/rdf+xml; charset=utf-8805http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/2443/2/license_rdf4460e5956bc1d1639be9ae6146a50347MD52LICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-82117http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/2443/3/license.txt691ed290c8bf8671811a9242b7fc04b6MD53TEXTThe_deterrence_effec_of_linear_versus_convex_fines_laboratory_evidence_Caffera.pdf.txtThe_deterrence_effec_of_linear_versus_convex_fines_laboratory_evidence_Caffera.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain84908http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/2443/4/The_deterrence_effec_of_linear_versus_convex_fines_laboratory_evidence_Caffera.pdf.txtdc932b916ed90bcf0df08a261b29f695MD54THUMBNAILThe_deterrence_effec_of_linear_versus_convex_fines_laboratory_evidence_Caffera.pdf.jpgThe_deterrence_effec_of_linear_versus_convex_fines_laboratory_evidence_Caffera.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg1517http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/2443/5/The_deterrence_effec_of_linear_versus_convex_fines_laboratory_evidence_Caffera.pdf.jpg1e0c25020a2cecbec6d7c64a5849b200MD5520.500.12806/24432024-06-13 03:00:21.921oai:redum.um.edu.uy:20.500.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Universidadhttps://um.edu.uy/https://redum.um.edu.uy/oai/requestnolascoaga@um.edu.uyUruguayopendoar:105012024-06-13T06:00:21REDUM - Universidad de Montevideofalse |
| spellingShingle | The deterrence effect of linear versus convex fines: laboratory evidence Caffera, Marcelo Environmental policy Enforcement Penaltystructure Laboratory experiments |
| status_str | publishedVersion |
| title | The deterrence effect of linear versus convex fines: laboratory evidence |
| title_full | The deterrence effect of linear versus convex fines: laboratory evidence |
| title_fullStr | The deterrence effect of linear versus convex fines: laboratory evidence |
| title_full_unstemmed | The deterrence effect of linear versus convex fines: laboratory evidence |
| title_short | The deterrence effect of linear versus convex fines: laboratory evidence |
| title_sort | The deterrence effect of linear versus convex fines: laboratory evidence |
| topic | Environmental policy Enforcement Penaltystructure Laboratory experiments |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/2443 https://doi.org/10.1080/15140326.2020.1848307 |
