Can political gridlock undermine checks and balances? A lab experiment
Resumen:
If checks and balances are aimed at protecting citizens from the government’s abuse of power, why do they sometimes weaken them? We address this question in a laboratory experiment in which subjects choose between two decision rules: with and without checks and balances. Voters may prefer an unchecked executive if that enables a reform that, otherwise, is blocked by the legislature. Consistent with our predictions, we find that subjects are more likely to weaken checks and balances when there is political gridlock. However, subjects weaken the controls not only when the reform is beneficial but also when it is harmful.
| 2024 | |
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Political agency Separation of powers Checks and balances Lab experiment |
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| Inglés | |
| Universidad de Montevideo | |
| REDUM | |
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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/2440
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2023.102128 |
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| Acceso embargado | |
| Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional |
| _version_ | 1807356681334554624 |
|---|---|
| author | Forteza, Álvaro |
| author2 | Mussio, Irene Juan S., Pereyra |
| author2_role | author author |
| author_facet | Forteza, Álvaro Mussio, Irene Juan S., Pereyra |
| author_role | author |
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| bitstream.url.fl_str_mv | http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/2440/1/Canpoliticalgridlocunderminechecksandbalances_Forteza.pdf http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/2440/2/license_rdf http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/2440/3/license.txt http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/2440/4/Canpoliticalgridlocunderminechecksandbalances_Forteza.pdf.txt http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/2440/5/Canpoliticalgridlocunderminechecksandbalances_Forteza.pdf.jpg |
| collection | REDUM |
| dc.contributor.filiacion.es.fl_str_mv | Forteza, Álvaro. Universidad de la República, Uruguay. Mussio, Irene. Leeds University Business School, United Kingdom Pereyra, Juan S. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv | Forteza, Álvaro Mussio, Irene Juan S., Pereyra |
| dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv | 2024-06-10T19:58:19Z |
| dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv | 2024-06-10T19:58:19Z |
| dc.date.embargoEnd.es.fl_str_mv | 2026-03-01 |
| dc.date.issued.es.fl_str_mv | 2024 |
| dc.description.abstract.none.fl_txt_mv | If checks and balances are aimed at protecting citizens from the government’s abuse of power, why do they sometimes weaken them? We address this question in a laboratory experiment in which subjects choose between two decision rules: with and without checks and balances. Voters may prefer an unchecked executive if that enables a reform that, otherwise, is blocked by the legislature. Consistent with our predictions, we find that subjects are more likely to weaken checks and balances when there is political gridlock. However, subjects weaken the controls not only when the reform is beneficial but also when it is harmful. |
| dc.format.mimetype.es.fl_str_mv | application/pdf |
| dc.identifier.doi.es.fl_str_mv | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2023.102128 |
| dc.identifier.issn.es.fl_str_mv | 2214-8051 |
| dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/2440 |
| dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv | eng |
| dc.publisher.es.fl_str_mv | Elsevier |
| dc.relation.ispartof.es.fl_str_mv | Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, vol. 108, 102128 |
| dc.rights.es.fl_str_mv | Embargado |
| dc.rights.license.none.fl_str_mv | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional |
| dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess |
| dc.rights.uri.*.fl_str_mv | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| dc.source.none.fl_str_mv | reponame:REDUM instname:Universidad de Montevideo instacron:Universidad de Montevideo |
| dc.subject.keyword.es.fl_str_mv | Political agency Separation of powers Checks and balances Lab experiment |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv | Can political gridlock undermine checks and balances? A lab experiment |
| dc.type.es.fl_str_mv | Artículo |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
| dc.type.version.es.fl_str_mv | Aceptada |
| dc.type.version.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion |
| description | If checks and balances are aimed at protecting citizens from the government’s abuse of power, why do they sometimes weaken them? We address this question in a laboratory experiment in which subjects choose between two decision rules: with and without checks and balances. Voters may prefer an unchecked executive if that enables a reform that, otherwise, is blocked by the legislature. Consistent with our predictions, we find that subjects are more likely to weaken checks and balances when there is political gridlock. However, subjects weaken the controls not only when the reform is beneficial but also when it is harmful. |
| eu_rights_str_mv | embargoedAccess |
| format | article |
| id | REDUM_cc60cab3376e13c962054ee56dba3597 |
| identifier_str_mv | 2214-8051 |
| instacron_str | Universidad de Montevideo |
| institution | Universidad de Montevideo |
| instname_str | Universidad de Montevideo |
| language | eng |
| network_acronym_str | REDUM |
| network_name_str | REDUM |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:redum.um.edu.uy:20.500.12806/2440 |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| reponame_str | REDUM |
| repository.mail.fl_str_mv | nolascoaga@um.edu.uy |
| repository.name.fl_str_mv | REDUM - Universidad de Montevideo |
| repository_id_str | 10501 |
| rights_invalid_str_mv | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional Embargado http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| spelling | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 InternacionalEmbargadohttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess633e06b5-729b-448a-88cf-77d6f4ed97fde2ce1a2b-2806-4dfd-bb61-f760987a9f75109cc1ad-97e7-4548-90ed-45e4f4a5071cForteza, Álvaro. Universidad de la República, Uruguay.Mussio, Irene. Leeds University Business School, United KingdomPereyra, Juan S. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay2024-06-10T19:58:19Z2024-06-10T19:58:19Z20242026-03-012214-8051https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/2440https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2023.102128application/pdfengElsevierJournal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, vol. 108, 102128Can political gridlock undermine checks and balances? A lab experimentArtículoAceptadainfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleIf checks and balances are aimed at protecting citizens from the government’s abuse of power, why do they sometimes weaken them? We address this question in a laboratory experiment in which subjects choose between two decision rules: with and without checks and balances. Voters may prefer an unchecked executive if that enables a reform that, otherwise, is blocked by the legislature. Consistent with our predictions, we find that subjects are more likely to weaken checks and balances when there is political gridlock. However, subjects weaken the controls not only when the reform is beneficial but also when it is harmful.Political agencySeparation of powersChecks and balancesLab experimentreponame:REDUMinstname:Universidad de Montevideoinstacron:Universidad de MontevideoForteza, ÁlvaroMussio, IreneJuan S., PereyraORIGINALCanpoliticalgridlocunderminechecksandbalances_Forteza.pdfCanpoliticalgridlocunderminechecksandbalances_Forteza.pdfapplication/pdf1299405http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/2440/1/Canpoliticalgridlocunderminechecksandbalances_Forteza.pdfbbd7c97a26d7f42bc76e79e7d72512edMD51CC-LICENSElicense_rdflicense_rdfapplication/rdf+xml; charset=utf-8805http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/2440/2/license_rdf4460e5956bc1d1639be9ae6146a50347MD52LICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-82117http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/2440/3/license.txt691ed290c8bf8671811a9242b7fc04b6MD53TEXTCanpoliticalgridlocunderminechecksandbalances_Forteza.pdf.txtCanpoliticalgridlocunderminechecksandbalances_Forteza.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain138457http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/2440/4/Canpoliticalgridlocunderminechecksandbalances_Forteza.pdf.txt98805e9b212419f64d923e4dcc523731MD54THUMBNAILCanpoliticalgridlocunderminechecksandbalances_Forteza.pdf.jpgCanpoliticalgridlocunderminechecksandbalances_Forteza.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg1403http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/2440/5/Canpoliticalgridlocunderminechecksandbalances_Forteza.pdf.jpg51547b5310a0216b532362ad2fd07d41MD5520.500.12806/24402024-06-12 15:32:11.435oai:redum.um.edu.uy:20.500.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Universidadhttps://um.edu.uy/https://redum.um.edu.uy/oai/requestnolascoaga@um.edu.uyUruguayopendoar:105012024-06-12T18:32:11REDUM - Universidad de Montevideofalse |
| spellingShingle | Can political gridlock undermine checks and balances? A lab experiment Forteza, Álvaro Political agency Separation of powers Checks and balances Lab experiment |
| status_str | acceptedVersion |
| title | Can political gridlock undermine checks and balances? A lab experiment |
| title_full | Can political gridlock undermine checks and balances? A lab experiment |
| title_fullStr | Can political gridlock undermine checks and balances? A lab experiment |
| title_full_unstemmed | Can political gridlock undermine checks and balances? A lab experiment |
| title_short | Can political gridlock undermine checks and balances? A lab experiment |
| title_sort | Can political gridlock undermine checks and balances? A lab experiment |
| topic | Political agency Separation of powers Checks and balances Lab experiment |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/2440 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2023.102128 |
