Anger and regulation
Resumen:
We study a model where agents experience anger when they see a firm that hasdisplayed insufficient concern for their clients' welfare (altruism) makes high profits.Regulation can increase welfare, for example, through fines (even with no changes inprices). Besides the standard channel (efficiency), regulation affects welfare through 2 channels: (i) regulation calms down existing consumers because a reduction in the proffits of an "unkind" firm increases total welfare by reducing consumer anger; and(ii) individuals who were out of the market when they were angry in the unregulated market, decide to purchase once the firm is regulated.
| 2012 | |
|
Public relations Commercial legitimacy Populism |
|
| Inglés | |
| Universidad de Montevideo | |
| REDUM | |
| https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1324 | |
| Acceso abierto | |
| Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional |
| _version_ | 1807356682111549440 |
|---|---|
| author | Dubra, Juan |
| author2 | Di Tella, Rafael |
| author2_role | author |
| author_facet | Dubra, Juan Di Tella, Rafael |
| author_role | author |
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| collection | REDUM |
| dc.contributor.filiacion.es.fl_str_mv | Dubra, Juan. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay Di Tella, Rafael. Harvard Business School |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv | Dubra, Juan Di Tella, Rafael |
| dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv | 2022-04-01T19:18:59Z |
| dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv | 2022-04-01T19:18:59Z |
| dc.date.issued.es.fl_str_mv | 2012 |
| dc.description.abstract.none.fl_txt_mv | We study a model where agents experience anger when they see a firm that hasdisplayed insufficient concern for their clients' welfare (altruism) makes high profits.Regulation can increase welfare, for example, through fines (even with no changes inprices). Besides the standard channel (efficiency), regulation affects welfare through 2 channels: (i) regulation calms down existing consumers because a reduction in the proffits of an "unkind" firm increases total welfare by reducing consumer anger; and(ii) individuals who were out of the market when they were angry in the unregulated market, decide to purchase once the firm is regulated. |
| dc.format.extent.es.fl_str_mv | 35 p. |
| dc.format.mimetype.es.fl_str_mv | application/pdf |
| dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1324 |
| dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv | eng |
| dc.publisher.es.fl_str_mv | Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía |
| dc.relation.ispartof.es.fl_str_mv | Documentos de trabajo del Departamento de Economía; UM_CEE_2012_03 |
| dc.rights.es.fl_str_mv | Abierto |
| dc.rights.license.none.fl_str_mv | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional |
| dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| dc.rights.uri.*.fl_str_mv | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| dc.source.none.fl_str_mv | reponame:REDUM instname:Universidad de Montevideo instacron:Universidad de Montevideo |
| dc.subject.es.fl_str_mv | Public relations Commercial legitimacy Populism |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv | Anger and regulation |
| dc.type.es.fl_str_mv | Documento de trabajo |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
| dc.type.version.es.fl_str_mv | Publicada |
| dc.type.version.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
| description | We study a model where agents experience anger when they see a firm that hasdisplayed insufficient concern for their clients' welfare (altruism) makes high profits.Regulation can increase welfare, for example, through fines (even with no changes inprices). Besides the standard channel (efficiency), regulation affects welfare through 2 channels: (i) regulation calms down existing consumers because a reduction in the proffits of an "unkind" firm increases total welfare by reducing consumer anger; and(ii) individuals who were out of the market when they were angry in the unregulated market, decide to purchase once the firm is regulated. |
| eu_rights_str_mv | openAccess |
| format | workingPaper |
| id | REDUM_b9695df81483832fd2f35ec08d49d782 |
| instacron_str | Universidad de Montevideo |
| institution | Universidad de Montevideo |
| instname_str | Universidad de Montevideo |
| language | eng |
| network_acronym_str | REDUM |
| network_name_str | REDUM |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:redum.um.edu.uy:20.500.12806/1324 |
| publishDate | 2012 |
| reponame_str | REDUM |
| repository.mail.fl_str_mv | nolascoaga@um.edu.uy |
| repository.name.fl_str_mv | REDUM - Universidad de Montevideo |
| repository_id_str | 10501 |
| rights_invalid_str_mv | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional Abierto http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| spelling | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 InternacionalAbiertohttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesseccacc7e-634f-4b0b-a338-a8d13974eb2c224dbd23-7928-42d5-860c-bb68d9eb5880Dubra, Juan. Universidad de Montevideo, UruguayDi Tella, Rafael. Harvard Business School2022-04-01T19:18:59Z2022-04-01T19:18:59Z2012https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1324We study a model where agents experience anger when they see a firm that hasdisplayed insufficient concern for their clients' welfare (altruism) makes high profits.Regulation can increase welfare, for example, through fines (even with no changes inprices). Besides the standard channel (efficiency), regulation affects welfare through 2 channels: (i) regulation calms down existing consumers because a reduction in the proffits of an "unkind" firm increases total welfare by reducing consumer anger; and(ii) individuals who were out of the market when they were angry in the unregulated market, decide to purchase once the firm is regulated.35 p.application/pdfengUniversidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de EconomíaDocumentos de trabajo del Departamento de Economía; UM_CEE_2012_03Public relationsCommercial legitimacyPopulismAnger and regulationDocumento de trabajoPublicadainfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperreponame:REDUMinstname:Universidad de Montevideoinstacron:Universidad de MontevideoDubra, JuanDi Tella, RafaelORIGINALworking_paper_um_cee_2012_03.pdfworking_paper_um_cee_2012_03.pdfapplication/pdf783179http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1324/1/working_paper_um_cee_2012_03.pdf09ef2f0a07269f92c69d23422e4be648MD51CC-LICENSElicense_rdflicense_rdfapplication/rdf+xml; charset=utf-8805http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1324/2/license_rdf4460e5956bc1d1639be9ae6146a50347MD52LICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-82117http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1324/3/license.txt691ed290c8bf8671811a9242b7fc04b6MD53TEXTworking_paper_um_cee_2012_03.pdf.txtworking_paper_um_cee_2012_03.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain78608http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1324/4/working_paper_um_cee_2012_03.pdf.txt03d574461c1eecca16ca30acbce0a2e0MD54THUMBNAILworking_paper_um_cee_2012_03.pdf.jpgworking_paper_um_cee_2012_03.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg1468http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1324/5/working_paper_um_cee_2012_03.pdf.jpg1e5aaab04b58dbd2cd8c83bb263a682fMD5520.500.12806/13242024-06-04 03:01:03.962oai:redum.um.edu.uy:20.500.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Universidadhttps://um.edu.uy/https://redum.um.edu.uy/oai/requestnolascoaga@um.edu.uyUruguayopendoar:105012024-06-04T06:01:03REDUM - Universidad de Montevideofalse |
| spellingShingle | Anger and regulation Dubra, Juan Public relations Commercial legitimacy Populism |
| status_str | publishedVersion |
| title | Anger and regulation |
| title_full | Anger and regulation |
| title_fullStr | Anger and regulation |
| title_full_unstemmed | Anger and regulation |
| title_short | Anger and regulation |
| title_sort | Anger and regulation |
| topic | Public relations Commercial legitimacy Populism |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1324 |
