Complementarity of inspections and permits as leverages for capping emissions: experimental evidence
Resumen:
Recent analysis on the cost-effectiveness of inducing perfect compliance in cap and trade programs is based on the possibility that a regulator has of inducing each individual firm to emit the same level of pollution by altering the supply of permits and the monitoring probability according to theoretical models that assume rational and risk-neutral agents. In this paper we test this possibility based on a series of laboratory experiments. Contrary to what theory predicts, our experiments suggest that a regulator cannot manipulate the supply of permits and the monitoring probability as suggested by these models and keep the level of emissions of each individual firm constant. This result does not depend on whether or not we control for risk aversion. Policy implications are discussed.
| 2012 | |
|
Environmental policy Enforcement Penalty structure Emissions standards Emissions trading Laboratory experiments |
|
| Inglés | |
| Universidad de Montevideo | |
| REDUM | |
| https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1328 | |
| Acceso abierto | |
| Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional |
| _version_ | 1807356682529931264 |
|---|---|
| author | Caffera, Marcelo |
| author2 | Chávez, Carlos |
| author2_role | author |
| author_facet | Caffera, Marcelo Chávez, Carlos |
| author_role | author |
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| bitstream.checksumAlgorithm.fl_str_mv | MD5 MD5 MD5 MD5 MD5 |
| bitstream.url.fl_str_mv | http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1328/1/working_paper_um_cee_2012_07.pdf http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1328/2/license_rdf http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1328/3/license.txt http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1328/4/working_paper_um_cee_2012_07.pdf.txt http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1328/5/working_paper_um_cee_2012_07.pdf.jpg |
| collection | REDUM |
| dc.contributor.filiacion.es.fl_str_mv | Caffera, Marcelo. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay Chávez, Carlos. Universidad de Concepción |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv | Caffera, Marcelo Chávez, Carlos |
| dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv | 2022-04-01T20:32:54Z |
| dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv | 2022-04-01T20:32:54Z |
| dc.date.issued.es.fl_str_mv | 2012 |
| dc.description.abstract.none.fl_txt_mv | Recent analysis on the cost-effectiveness of inducing perfect compliance in cap and trade programs is based on the possibility that a regulator has of inducing each individual firm to emit the same level of pollution by altering the supply of permits and the monitoring probability according to theoretical models that assume rational and risk-neutral agents. In this paper we test this possibility based on a series of laboratory experiments. Contrary to what theory predicts, our experiments suggest that a regulator cannot manipulate the supply of permits and the monitoring probability as suggested by these models and keep the level of emissions of each individual firm constant. This result does not depend on whether or not we control for risk aversion. Policy implications are discussed. |
| dc.format.extent.es.fl_str_mv | 34 p. |
| dc.format.mimetype.es.fl_str_mv | application/pdf |
| dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1328 |
| dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv | eng |
| dc.publisher.es.fl_str_mv | Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía |
| dc.relation.ispartof.es.fl_str_mv | Documentos de trabajo del Departamento de Economía; UM_CEE_2012_07 |
| dc.rights.es.fl_str_mv | Abierto |
| dc.rights.license.none.fl_str_mv | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional |
| dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| dc.rights.uri.*.fl_str_mv | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| dc.source.none.fl_str_mv | reponame:REDUM instname:Universidad de Montevideo instacron:Universidad de Montevideo |
| dc.subject.es.fl_str_mv | Environmental policy Enforcement Penalty structure Emissions standards Emissions trading Laboratory experiments |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv | Complementarity of inspections and permits as leverages for capping emissions: experimental evidence |
| dc.type.es.fl_str_mv | Documento de trabajo |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
| dc.type.version.es.fl_str_mv | Publicada |
| dc.type.version.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
| description | Recent analysis on the cost-effectiveness of inducing perfect compliance in cap and trade programs is based on the possibility that a regulator has of inducing each individual firm to emit the same level of pollution by altering the supply of permits and the monitoring probability according to theoretical models that assume rational and risk-neutral agents. In this paper we test this possibility based on a series of laboratory experiments. Contrary to what theory predicts, our experiments suggest that a regulator cannot manipulate the supply of permits and the monitoring probability as suggested by these models and keep the level of emissions of each individual firm constant. This result does not depend on whether or not we control for risk aversion. Policy implications are discussed. |
| eu_rights_str_mv | openAccess |
| format | workingPaper |
| id | REDUM_a2c599155254924a6f05c26e26a8d932 |
| instacron_str | Universidad de Montevideo |
| institution | Universidad de Montevideo |
| instname_str | Universidad de Montevideo |
| language | eng |
| network_acronym_str | REDUM |
| network_name_str | REDUM |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:redum.um.edu.uy:20.500.12806/1328 |
| publishDate | 2012 |
| reponame_str | REDUM |
| repository.mail.fl_str_mv | nolascoaga@um.edu.uy |
| repository.name.fl_str_mv | REDUM - Universidad de Montevideo |
| repository_id_str | 10501 |
| rights_invalid_str_mv | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional Abierto http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| spelling | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 InternacionalAbiertohttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess29379aa7-bd77-483a-9074-54df31de362e9b42c627-a3c8-425f-a478-23a2f0ec6700Caffera, Marcelo. Universidad de Montevideo, UruguayChávez, Carlos. Universidad de Concepción2022-04-01T20:32:54Z2022-04-01T20:32:54Z2012https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1328Recent analysis on the cost-effectiveness of inducing perfect compliance in cap and trade programs is based on the possibility that a regulator has of inducing each individual firm to emit the same level of pollution by altering the supply of permits and the monitoring probability according to theoretical models that assume rational and risk-neutral agents. In this paper we test this possibility based on a series of laboratory experiments. Contrary to what theory predicts, our experiments suggest that a regulator cannot manipulate the supply of permits and the monitoring probability as suggested by these models and keep the level of emissions of each individual firm constant. This result does not depend on whether or not we control for risk aversion. Policy implications are discussed.34 p.application/pdfengUniversidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de EconomíaDocumentos de trabajo del Departamento de Economía; UM_CEE_2012_07Environmental policyEnforcementPenalty structureEmissions standardsEmissions tradingLaboratory experimentsComplementarity of inspections and permits as leverages for capping emissions: experimental evidenceDocumento de trabajoPublicadainfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperreponame:REDUMinstname:Universidad de Montevideoinstacron:Universidad de MontevideoCaffera, MarceloChávez, CarlosORIGINALworking_paper_um_cee_2012_07.pdfworking_paper_um_cee_2012_07.pdfapplication/pdf388885http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1328/1/working_paper_um_cee_2012_07.pdf9e77f1fa299698d5d5ec652874a3da86MD51CC-LICENSElicense_rdflicense_rdfapplication/rdf+xml; charset=utf-8805http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1328/2/license_rdf4460e5956bc1d1639be9ae6146a50347MD52LICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-82117http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1328/3/license.txt691ed290c8bf8671811a9242b7fc04b6MD53TEXTworking_paper_um_cee_2012_07.pdf.txtworking_paper_um_cee_2012_07.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain60637http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1328/4/working_paper_um_cee_2012_07.pdf.txt3d8e4dd8ed78f7407bb912b41cb93893MD54THUMBNAILworking_paper_um_cee_2012_07.pdf.jpgworking_paper_um_cee_2012_07.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg1458http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1328/5/working_paper_um_cee_2012_07.pdf.jpg72c0b016ff67ad490b93a3adceadd51dMD5520.500.12806/13282024-06-04 03:01:07.658oai:redum.um.edu.uy:20.500.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Universidadhttps://um.edu.uy/https://redum.um.edu.uy/oai/requestnolascoaga@um.edu.uyUruguayopendoar:105012024-06-04T06:01:07REDUM - Universidad de Montevideofalse |
| spellingShingle | Complementarity of inspections and permits as leverages for capping emissions: experimental evidence Caffera, Marcelo Environmental policy Enforcement Penalty structure Emissions standards Emissions trading Laboratory experiments |
| status_str | publishedVersion |
| title | Complementarity of inspections and permits as leverages for capping emissions: experimental evidence |
| title_full | Complementarity of inspections and permits as leverages for capping emissions: experimental evidence |
| title_fullStr | Complementarity of inspections and permits as leverages for capping emissions: experimental evidence |
| title_full_unstemmed | Complementarity of inspections and permits as leverages for capping emissions: experimental evidence |
| title_short | Complementarity of inspections and permits as leverages for capping emissions: experimental evidence |
| title_sort | Complementarity of inspections and permits as leverages for capping emissions: experimental evidence |
| topic | Environmental policy Enforcement Penalty structure Emissions standards Emissions trading Laboratory experiments |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1328 |
