Capital structure under collusion
Resumen:
We study the financial leverage of firms that collude by forming a cartel. We find that cartel firms have lower leverage ratios during collusion periods, consistent with the idea that reductions in leverage help increase cartel stability. Cartel firms have a surprisingly large economic footprint (they represent more than 20% of the total market capitalization in the U.S.), so understanding their decisions is relevant. Our findings show that anti-competitive behavior has a significant effect on capital structure choices. They also shed new light on the relation between profitability and financial leverage.
| 2016 | |
|
Capital structure Financial leverage Financial policies Collusion Cartels Trigger strategies |
|
| Inglés | |
| Universidad de Montevideo | |
| REDUM | |
| https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1352 | |
| Acceso abierto | |
| Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional |
| _version_ | 1807356682755375104 |
|---|---|
| author | Ferrés, Daniel |
| author2 | Ormazabal, Gaizka Povel, Paul Sertsios, Giorgio |
| author2_role | author author author |
| author_facet | Ferrés, Daniel Ormazabal, Gaizka Povel, Paul Sertsios, Giorgio |
| author_role | author |
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| bitstream.checksumAlgorithm.fl_str_mv | MD5 MD5 MD5 MD5 MD5 |
| bitstream.url.fl_str_mv | http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1352/1/Capital_Structure_Under_Collusion.pdf http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1352/2/license_rdf http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1352/3/license.txt http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1352/4/Capital_Structure_Under_Collusion.pdf.txt http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1352/5/Capital_Structure_Under_Collusion.pdf.jpg |
| collection | REDUM |
| dc.contributor.filiacion.es.fl_str_mv | Ferrés, Daniel. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay Ormazabal, Gaizka. IESE Business School Povel, Paul. University of Houston Sertsios, Giorgio. Universidad de los Andes |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv | Ferrés, Daniel Ormazabal, Gaizka Povel, Paul Sertsios, Giorgio |
| dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv | 2022-04-27T18:54:45Z |
| dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv | 2022-04-27T18:54:45Z |
| dc.date.issued.es.fl_str_mv | 2016 |
| dc.description.abstract.none.fl_txt_mv | We study the financial leverage of firms that collude by forming a cartel. We find that cartel firms have lower leverage ratios during collusion periods, consistent with the idea that reductions in leverage help increase cartel stability. Cartel firms have a surprisingly large economic footprint (they represent more than 20% of the total market capitalization in the U.S.), so understanding their decisions is relevant. Our findings show that anti-competitive behavior has a significant effect on capital structure choices. They also shed new light on the relation between profitability and financial leverage. |
| dc.format.extent.es.fl_str_mv | 62 p. |
| dc.format.mimetype.es.fl_str_mv | application/pdf |
| dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1352 |
| dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv | eng |
| dc.publisher.es.fl_str_mv | Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía |
| dc.relation.ispartof.es.fl_str_mv | Documentos de trabajo del Departamento de Economía |
| dc.rights.es.fl_str_mv | Abierto |
| dc.rights.license.none.fl_str_mv | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional |
| dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| dc.rights.uri.*.fl_str_mv | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| dc.source.none.fl_str_mv | reponame:REDUM instname:Universidad de Montevideo instacron:Universidad de Montevideo |
| dc.subject.es.fl_str_mv | Capital structure Financial leverage Financial policies Collusion Cartels Trigger strategies |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv | Capital structure under collusion |
| dc.type.es.fl_str_mv | Documento de trabajo |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
| dc.type.version.es.fl_str_mv | Publicada |
| dc.type.version.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
| description | We study the financial leverage of firms that collude by forming a cartel. We find that cartel firms have lower leverage ratios during collusion periods, consistent with the idea that reductions in leverage help increase cartel stability. Cartel firms have a surprisingly large economic footprint (they represent more than 20% of the total market capitalization in the U.S.), so understanding their decisions is relevant. Our findings show that anti-competitive behavior has a significant effect on capital structure choices. They also shed new light on the relation between profitability and financial leverage. |
| eu_rights_str_mv | openAccess |
| format | workingPaper |
| id | REDUM_938525abe66b2bb72775f4e11028a77a |
| instacron_str | Universidad de Montevideo |
| institution | Universidad de Montevideo |
| instname_str | Universidad de Montevideo |
| language | eng |
| network_acronym_str | REDUM |
| network_name_str | REDUM |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:redum.um.edu.uy:20.500.12806/1352 |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| reponame_str | REDUM |
| repository.mail.fl_str_mv | nolascoaga@um.edu.uy |
| repository.name.fl_str_mv | REDUM - Universidad de Montevideo |
| repository_id_str | 10501 |
| rights_invalid_str_mv | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional Abierto http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| spelling | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 InternacionalAbiertohttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessaafbd4ba-d154-41cb-87b6-181b79974418c6fb8a82-f581-4ec5-9a6f-48c692b4b37b91dc9adb-5b29-49d9-ac37-90d0d61d7d73dfa7feb8-8dc4-448f-939e-0120c3a157b0Ferrés, Daniel. Universidad de Montevideo, UruguayOrmazabal, Gaizka. IESE Business SchoolPovel, Paul. University of HoustonSertsios, Giorgio. Universidad de los Andes2022-04-27T18:54:45Z2022-04-27T18:54:45Z2016https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1352We study the financial leverage of firms that collude by forming a cartel. We find that cartel firms have lower leverage ratios during collusion periods, consistent with the idea that reductions in leverage help increase cartel stability. Cartel firms have a surprisingly large economic footprint (they represent more than 20% of the total market capitalization in the U.S.), so understanding their decisions is relevant. Our findings show that anti-competitive behavior has a significant effect on capital structure choices. They also shed new light on the relation between profitability and financial leverage.62 p.application/pdfengUniversidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de EconomíaDocumentos de trabajo del Departamento de EconomíaCapital structureFinancial leverageFinancial policiesCollusionCartelsTrigger strategiesCapital structure under collusionDocumento de trabajoPublicadainfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperreponame:REDUMinstname:Universidad de Montevideoinstacron:Universidad de MontevideoFerrés, DanielOrmazabal, GaizkaPovel, PaulSertsios, GiorgioORIGINALCapital_Structure_Under_Collusion.pdfCapital_Structure_Under_Collusion.pdfapplication/pdf1498290http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1352/1/Capital_Structure_Under_Collusion.pdf86cf7a1ab113d956bcd56ec7fb7ddf70MD51CC-LICENSElicense_rdflicense_rdfapplication/rdf+xml; charset=utf-8805http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1352/2/license_rdf4460e5956bc1d1639be9ae6146a50347MD52LICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-82117http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1352/3/license.txt691ed290c8bf8671811a9242b7fc04b6MD53TEXTCapital_Structure_Under_Collusion.pdf.txtCapital_Structure_Under_Collusion.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain125622http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1352/4/Capital_Structure_Under_Collusion.pdf.txt5b83638d1f3274c18cf77ab79f330815MD54THUMBNAILCapital_Structure_Under_Collusion.pdf.jpgCapital_Structure_Under_Collusion.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg1448http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1352/5/Capital_Structure_Under_Collusion.pdf.jpg1b16b4515bd03281b2fa6734e488a33dMD5520.500.12806/13522024-06-04 03:00:39.076oai:redum.um.edu.uy:20.500.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Universidadhttps://um.edu.uy/https://redum.um.edu.uy/oai/requestnolascoaga@um.edu.uyUruguayopendoar:105012024-06-04T06:00:39REDUM - Universidad de Montevideofalse |
| spellingShingle | Capital structure under collusion Ferrés, Daniel Capital structure Financial leverage Financial policies Collusion Cartels Trigger strategies |
| status_str | publishedVersion |
| title | Capital structure under collusion |
| title_full | Capital structure under collusion |
| title_fullStr | Capital structure under collusion |
| title_full_unstemmed | Capital structure under collusion |
| title_short | Capital structure under collusion |
| title_sort | Capital structure under collusion |
| topic | Capital structure Financial leverage Financial policies Collusion Cartels Trigger strategies |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1352 |
