The Uruguayan Constitution as a Majoritarian and Accessible Norm. The “Living” Constituent Power and the Configuration of a Weak Model of Constitutionalism
La Constitución uruguaya como norma mayoritaria y asequible. El constituyente “vivo” y la configuración de un modelo débil de constitucionalismo
A Constituição uruguaia como norma majoritária e acessível. O constituinte “vivo” e a configuração de um modelo fraco de constitucionalismo
| 2026 | |
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Constitucionalismo débil Reforma constitucional Interpretación constitucional Constitucionalismo dialógico Weak constitutionalism Constitutional reform Constitutional interpretation Dialogic constitutionalism Constitucionalismo débil Reforma constitucional Interpretação constitucional Constitucionalismo dialógico |
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| Español | |
| Universidad de Montevideo | |
| REDUM | |
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https://revistas.um.edu.uy/index.php/revistaderecho/article/view/2051
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/3464 |
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| Acceso abierto | |
| Atribución 4.0 Internacional |
| Sumario: | This paper argues that the Uruguayan Constitution establishes a weak model of constitutionalism, characterized by an interpretive dialogue among different institutional actors and by a conception of citizenship as a relevant spokesperson for constitutional meaning. The constitutional amendment procedures set forth in paragraphs A and B of Article 331 of the Constitution — based on accessible initiation mechanisms and direct majoritarian decision-making — are decisive in shaping a “living” constituent power, capable of effectively responding to judicial decisions that advance constitutional interpretations not shared by the citizenry. The aforementioned features of the derived constituent power, together with the characteristics of the constitutional review mechanism provided for in Articles 256 et seq. of the Constitution, prevent the constitutional design as a whole from being understood as counter-majoritarian. Instead, they define a model grounded in interpretive dialogue, with a pronounced majoritarian dimension, and active citizenship. From the perspective proposed herein, the paper warns, on the one hand, against the risks of decontextualized doctrinal transplants and, on the other, highlights the difficulties in reconciling a weak model of constitutionalism — such as the Uruguayan one — with a strong and interpretively final conventionalism, such as that judicially advanced by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. |
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