Uncertain penalties and compliance
Resumen:
Using a series of laboratory economic experiments, we study the effect of information regarding the amount of the fine on the individual decision to violate an emission standard. Specifically, the analysis considers variations in the information available for the regulated subjects regarding the amount of the monetary sanction, as well as variations in the stringency in the inspection effort by the regulator.Our results suggest that in the case of a regulation design that induces compliance, the presence of uncertainty regarding the amount of the fine may increase violations in certain cases. When enforcement is not sufficient to induce compliance, the uncertainty regarding the amount of the fine does not have any effect on the level of transgression. Overall, the results suggest that a cost-effective regulation design should consider including public information on the consequences of an offense.
| 2014 | |
|
Uncertainty Risk Compound risk Fine Emission standard Economic experiment |
|
| Inglés | |
| Universidad de Montevideo | |
| REDUM | |
| https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1334 | |
| Acceso abierto | |
| Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional |
| _version_ | 1807356682615914496 |
|---|---|
| author | Luengo, Carol |
| author2 | Caffera, Marcelo Chávez, Carlos |
| author2_role | author author |
| author_facet | Luengo, Carol Caffera, Marcelo Chávez, Carlos |
| author_role | author |
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| bitstream.checksumAlgorithm.fl_str_mv | MD5 MD5 MD5 MD5 MD5 |
| bitstream.url.fl_str_mv | http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1334/1/working_paper_um_cee_2014_07.pdf http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1334/2/license_rdf http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1334/3/license.txt http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1334/4/working_paper_um_cee_2014_07.pdf.txt http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1334/5/working_paper_um_cee_2014_07.pdf.jpg |
| collection | REDUM |
| dc.contributor.filiacion.es.fl_str_mv | Luengo, Carol. Universidad de Concepción Caffera, Marcelo. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay Chávez, Carlos. Universidad de Concepción |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv | Luengo, Carol Caffera, Marcelo Chávez, Carlos |
| dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv | 2022-04-20T18:03:00Z |
| dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv | 2022-04-20T18:03:00Z |
| dc.date.issued.es.fl_str_mv | 2014 |
| dc.description.abstract.none.fl_txt_mv | Using a series of laboratory economic experiments, we study the effect of information regarding the amount of the fine on the individual decision to violate an emission standard. Specifically, the analysis considers variations in the information available for the regulated subjects regarding the amount of the monetary sanction, as well as variations in the stringency in the inspection effort by the regulator.Our results suggest that in the case of a regulation design that induces compliance, the presence of uncertainty regarding the amount of the fine may increase violations in certain cases. When enforcement is not sufficient to induce compliance, the uncertainty regarding the amount of the fine does not have any effect on the level of transgression. Overall, the results suggest that a cost-effective regulation design should consider including public information on the consequences of an offense. |
| dc.format.extent.es.fl_str_mv | 31 p. |
| dc.format.mimetype.es.fl_str_mv | application/pdf |
| dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1334 |
| dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv | eng |
| dc.publisher.es.fl_str_mv | Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía |
| dc.relation.ispartof.es.fl_str_mv | Documentos de trabajo del Departamento de Economía; UM_CEE_2014_07 |
| dc.rights.es.fl_str_mv | Abierto |
| dc.rights.license.none.fl_str_mv | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional |
| dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| dc.rights.uri.*.fl_str_mv | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| dc.source.none.fl_str_mv | reponame:REDUM instname:Universidad de Montevideo instacron:Universidad de Montevideo |
| dc.subject.es.fl_str_mv | Uncertainty Risk Compound risk Fine Emission standard Economic experiment |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv | Uncertain penalties and compliance |
| dc.type.es.fl_str_mv | Documento de trabajo |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
| dc.type.version.es.fl_str_mv | Publicada |
| dc.type.version.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
| description | Using a series of laboratory economic experiments, we study the effect of information regarding the amount of the fine on the individual decision to violate an emission standard. Specifically, the analysis considers variations in the information available for the regulated subjects regarding the amount of the monetary sanction, as well as variations in the stringency in the inspection effort by the regulator.Our results suggest that in the case of a regulation design that induces compliance, the presence of uncertainty regarding the amount of the fine may increase violations in certain cases. When enforcement is not sufficient to induce compliance, the uncertainty regarding the amount of the fine does not have any effect on the level of transgression. Overall, the results suggest that a cost-effective regulation design should consider including public information on the consequences of an offense. |
| eu_rights_str_mv | openAccess |
| format | workingPaper |
| id | REDUM_56fdc78c84c2902b7686de4371260c63 |
| instacron_str | Universidad de Montevideo |
| institution | Universidad de Montevideo |
| instname_str | Universidad de Montevideo |
| language | eng |
| network_acronym_str | REDUM |
| network_name_str | REDUM |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:redum.um.edu.uy:20.500.12806/1334 |
| publishDate | 2014 |
| reponame_str | REDUM |
| repository.mail.fl_str_mv | nolascoaga@um.edu.uy |
| repository.name.fl_str_mv | REDUM - Universidad de Montevideo |
| repository_id_str | 10501 |
| rights_invalid_str_mv | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional Abierto http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| spelling | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 InternacionalAbiertohttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess7053f9c5-9742-4f5a-a83e-ed6abafd629529379aa7-bd77-483a-9074-54df31de362e9b42c627-a3c8-425f-a478-23a2f0ec6700Luengo, Carol. Universidad de ConcepciónCaffera, Marcelo. Universidad de Montevideo, UruguayChávez, Carlos. Universidad de Concepción2022-04-20T18:03:00Z2022-04-20T18:03:00Z2014https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1334Using a series of laboratory economic experiments, we study the effect of information regarding the amount of the fine on the individual decision to violate an emission standard. Specifically, the analysis considers variations in the information available for the regulated subjects regarding the amount of the monetary sanction, as well as variations in the stringency in the inspection effort by the regulator.Our results suggest that in the case of a regulation design that induces compliance, the presence of uncertainty regarding the amount of the fine may increase violations in certain cases. When enforcement is not sufficient to induce compliance, the uncertainty regarding the amount of the fine does not have any effect on the level of transgression. Overall, the results suggest that a cost-effective regulation design should consider including public information on the consequences of an offense.31 p.application/pdfengUniversidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de EconomíaDocumentos de trabajo del Departamento de Economía; UM_CEE_2014_07UncertaintyRiskCompound riskFineEmission standardEconomic experimentUncertain penalties and complianceDocumento de trabajoPublicadainfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperreponame:REDUMinstname:Universidad de Montevideoinstacron:Universidad de MontevideoLuengo, CarolCaffera, MarceloChávez, CarlosORIGINALworking_paper_um_cee_2014_07.pdfworking_paper_um_cee_2014_07.pdfapplication/pdf581904http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1334/1/working_paper_um_cee_2014_07.pdf56b74b000e72d64ae8235a7f79377c99MD51CC-LICENSElicense_rdflicense_rdfapplication/rdf+xml; charset=utf-8805http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1334/2/license_rdf4460e5956bc1d1639be9ae6146a50347MD52LICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-82117http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1334/3/license.txt691ed290c8bf8671811a9242b7fc04b6MD53TEXTworking_paper_um_cee_2014_07.pdf.txtworking_paper_um_cee_2014_07.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain49388http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1334/4/working_paper_um_cee_2014_07.pdf.txtc5c70a0c4c0c12fd6e9fcb245770597bMD54THUMBNAILworking_paper_um_cee_2014_07.pdf.jpgworking_paper_um_cee_2014_07.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg1594http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1334/5/working_paper_um_cee_2014_07.pdf.jpg0e3a13e3cfe94bf96a5462a7d1205f62MD5520.500.12806/13342024-06-04 03:00:24.449oai:redum.um.edu.uy:20.500.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Universidadhttps://um.edu.uy/https://redum.um.edu.uy/oai/requestnolascoaga@um.edu.uyUruguayopendoar:105012024-06-04T06:00:24REDUM - Universidad de Montevideofalse |
| spellingShingle | Uncertain penalties and compliance Luengo, Carol Uncertainty Risk Compound risk Fine Emission standard Economic experiment |
| status_str | publishedVersion |
| title | Uncertain penalties and compliance |
| title_full | Uncertain penalties and compliance |
| title_fullStr | Uncertain penalties and compliance |
| title_full_unstemmed | Uncertain penalties and compliance |
| title_short | Uncertain penalties and compliance |
| title_sort | Uncertain penalties and compliance |
| topic | Uncertainty Risk Compound risk Fine Emission standard Economic experiment |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1334 |
