Capital structure under collusion
Resumen:
We analyze the financial leverage of firms that collude to soften product market competition, by forming a cartel. We find that cartel firms have lower leverage during collusion periods. This is consistent with the idea that cartel firms strategically reduce leverage to make their cartels more stable, because high leverage makes deviations from a cartel agreement more attractive. Given that cartels have a large economic footprint, their study is also relevant for the capital structure literature, which has largely ignored the role of anti-competitive behavior.
| 2021 | |
|
Capital structure Financial leverage Collusion Cartels |
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| Inglés | |
| Universidad de Montevideo | |
| REDUM | |
|
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1394
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2020.100854 |
|
| Acceso abierto | |
| Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional |
| _version_ | 1807356681242279936 |
|---|---|
| author | Ferrés, Daniel |
| author2 | Ormazabal, Gaizka Povel, Paul Sertsios, Giorgio |
| author2_role | author author author |
| author_facet | Ferrés, Daniel Ormazabal, Gaizka Povel, Paul Sertsios, Giorgio |
| author_role | author |
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| bitstream.checksumAlgorithm.fl_str_mv | MD5 MD5 MD5 MD5 MD5 |
| bitstream.url.fl_str_mv | http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1394/1/Capital%20Structure%20Under%20Collusion%202019.pdf http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1394/2/license_rdf http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1394/3/license.txt http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1394/4/Capital%20Structure%20Under%20Collusion%202019.pdf.txt http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1394/5/Capital%20Structure%20Under%20Collusion%202019.pdf.jpg |
| collection | REDUM |
| dc.contributor.filiacion.es.fl_str_mv | Ferrés, Daniel. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv | Ferrés, Daniel Ormazabal, Gaizka Povel, Paul Sertsios, Giorgio |
| dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv | 2022-10-05T19:47:38Z |
| dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv | 2022-10-05T19:47:38Z |
| dc.date.issued.es.fl_str_mv | 2021 |
| dc.description.abstract.none.fl_txt_mv | We analyze the financial leverage of firms that collude to soften product market competition, by forming a cartel. We find that cartel firms have lower leverage during collusion periods. This is consistent with the idea that cartel firms strategically reduce leverage to make their cartels more stable, because high leverage makes deviations from a cartel agreement more attractive. Given that cartels have a large economic footprint, their study is also relevant for the capital structure literature, which has largely ignored the role of anti-competitive behavior. |
| dc.format.mimetype.es.fl_str_mv | application/pdf |
| dc.identifier.doi.es.fl_str_mv | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2020.100854 |
| dc.identifier.issn.es.fl_str_mv | 1096-0473 |
| dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1394 |
| dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv | eng |
| dc.publisher.es.fl_str_mv | Elsevier |
| dc.relation.ispartof.es.fl_str_mv | Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 45, 100854 |
| dc.rights.es.fl_str_mv | Abierto |
| dc.rights.license.none.fl_str_mv | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional |
| dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| dc.rights.uri.*.fl_str_mv | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| dc.source.none.fl_str_mv | reponame:REDUM instname:Universidad de Montevideo instacron:Universidad de Montevideo |
| dc.subject.keyword.es.fl_str_mv | Capital structure Financial leverage Collusion Cartels |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv | Capital structure under collusion |
| dc.type.es.fl_str_mv | Artículo |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
| dc.type.version.es.fl_str_mv | Aceptada |
| dc.type.version.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion |
| description | We analyze the financial leverage of firms that collude to soften product market competition, by forming a cartel. We find that cartel firms have lower leverage during collusion periods. This is consistent with the idea that cartel firms strategically reduce leverage to make their cartels more stable, because high leverage makes deviations from a cartel agreement more attractive. Given that cartels have a large economic footprint, their study is also relevant for the capital structure literature, which has largely ignored the role of anti-competitive behavior. |
| eu_rights_str_mv | openAccess |
| format | article |
| id | REDUM_4ce84ffcf8f25a85eaad2003b8975c4d |
| identifier_str_mv | 1096-0473 |
| instacron_str | Universidad de Montevideo |
| institution | Universidad de Montevideo |
| instname_str | Universidad de Montevideo |
| language | eng |
| network_acronym_str | REDUM |
| network_name_str | REDUM |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:redum.um.edu.uy:20.500.12806/1394 |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| reponame_str | REDUM |
| repository.mail.fl_str_mv | nolascoaga@um.edu.uy |
| repository.name.fl_str_mv | REDUM - Universidad de Montevideo |
| repository_id_str | 10501 |
| rights_invalid_str_mv | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional Abierto http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| spelling | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 InternacionalAbiertohttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessaafbd4ba-d154-41cb-87b6-181b79974418c6fb8a82-f581-4ec5-9a6f-48c692b4b37b91dc9adb-5b29-49d9-ac37-90d0d61d7d73dfa7feb8-8dc4-448f-939e-0120c3a157b0Ferrés, Daniel. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay2022-10-05T19:47:38Z2022-10-05T19:47:38Z20211096-0473https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1394https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2020.100854application/pdfengElsevierJournal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 45, 100854Capital structure under collusionArtículoAceptadainfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleWe analyze the financial leverage of firms that collude to soften product market competition, by forming a cartel. We find that cartel firms have lower leverage during collusion periods. This is consistent with the idea that cartel firms strategically reduce leverage to make their cartels more stable, because high leverage makes deviations from a cartel agreement more attractive. 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| spellingShingle | Capital structure under collusion Ferrés, Daniel Capital structure Financial leverage Collusion Cartels |
| status_str | acceptedVersion |
| title | Capital structure under collusion |
| title_full | Capital structure under collusion |
| title_fullStr | Capital structure under collusion |
| title_full_unstemmed | Capital structure under collusion |
| title_short | Capital structure under collusion |
| title_sort | Capital structure under collusion |
| topic | Capital structure Financial leverage Collusion Cartels |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1394 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2020.100854 |
