Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: when is there a trade-off?
Resumen:
A classic trade-off that school districts face when deciding which matching algorithm to use is that it is not possible to always respect both priorities and preferences. The student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) respects priorities but can lead to inefficient allocations. We identify a new condition on school choice markets under which DA is efficient. Our condition generalizes earlier conditions by placing restrictions on how preferences and priorities relate to one another only on the parts that are relevant for the assignment. Whenever there is a unique allocation that respects priorities, our condition captures all the environments for which DA is efficient. We show through stylized examples and simulations that our condition significantly expands the range of known environments for which DA is efficient. We also discuss how our condition sheds light on existing empirical findings.
| 2024 | |
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Matching Envyfreeness Fairness Efficiency Priorities Preferences Mutually best pairs. |
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| Inglés | |
| Universidad de Montevideo | |
| REDUM | |
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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/2640
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.012 |
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| Acceso embargado | |
| Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional |
| _version_ | 1811977111089446912 |
|---|---|
| author | Cantillon, Estelle |
| author2 | Chen, Li Pereyra, Juan |
| author2_role | author author |
| author_facet | Cantillon, Estelle Chen, Li Pereyra, Juan |
| author_role | author |
| bitstream.checksum.fl_str_mv | 189f0c5f3000c092c7f8ce5b82ca8ecd 4460e5956bc1d1639be9ae6146a50347 691ed290c8bf8671811a9242b7fc04b6 |
| bitstream.checksumAlgorithm.fl_str_mv | MD5 MD5 MD5 |
| bitstream.url.fl_str_mv | http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/2640/1/2212.02881v3.pdf http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/2640/2/license_rdf http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/2640/3/license.txt |
| collection | REDUM |
| dc.contributor.filiacion.es.fl_str_mv | Pereyra, Juan S. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv | Cantillon, Estelle Chen, Li Pereyra, Juan |
| dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv | 2024-10-02T18:37:02Z |
| dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv | 2024-10-02T18:37:02Z |
| dc.date.embargoEnd.es.fl_str_mv | 2026-12-01 |
| dc.date.issued.es.fl_str_mv | 2024 |
| dc.description.abstract.none.fl_txt_mv | A classic trade-off that school districts face when deciding which matching algorithm to use is that it is not possible to always respect both priorities and preferences. The student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) respects priorities but can lead to inefficient allocations. We identify a new condition on school choice markets under which DA is efficient. Our condition generalizes earlier conditions by placing restrictions on how preferences and priorities relate to one another only on the parts that are relevant for the assignment. Whenever there is a unique allocation that respects priorities, our condition captures all the environments for which DA is efficient. We show through stylized examples and simulations that our condition significantly expands the range of known environments for which DA is efficient. We also discuss how our condition sheds light on existing empirical findings. |
| dc.format.extent.es.fl_str_mv | pp. 82-96 |
| dc.format.mimetype.es.fl_str_mv | application/pdf |
| dc.identifier.doi.es.fl_str_mv | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.012 |
| dc.identifier.issn.es.fl_str_mv | 0899-8256 |
| dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/2640 |
| dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv | eng |
| dc.publisher.es.fl_str_mv | ScienceDirect |
| dc.relation.ispartof.es.fl_str_mv | Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 148, 82-96 |
| dc.rights.es.fl_str_mv | Embargado |
| dc.rights.license.none.fl_str_mv | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional |
| dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess |
| dc.rights.uri.*.fl_str_mv | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| dc.source.none.fl_str_mv | reponame:REDUM instname:Universidad de Montevideo instacron:Universidad de Montevideo |
| dc.subject.keyword.es.fl_str_mv | Matching Envyfreeness Fairness Efficiency Priorities Preferences Mutually best pairs. |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv | Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: when is there a trade-off? |
| dc.type.es.fl_str_mv | Artículo |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
| dc.type.version.es.fl_str_mv | Aceptada |
| dc.type.version.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion |
| description | A classic trade-off that school districts face when deciding which matching algorithm to use is that it is not possible to always respect both priorities and preferences. The student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) respects priorities but can lead to inefficient allocations. We identify a new condition on school choice markets under which DA is efficient. Our condition generalizes earlier conditions by placing restrictions on how preferences and priorities relate to one another only on the parts that are relevant for the assignment. Whenever there is a unique allocation that respects priorities, our condition captures all the environments for which DA is efficient. We show through stylized examples and simulations that our condition significantly expands the range of known environments for which DA is efficient. We also discuss how our condition sheds light on existing empirical findings. |
| eu_rights_str_mv | embargoedAccess |
| format | article |
| id | REDUM_0b85d0be5e28f9018fed462f04d51c5c |
| identifier_str_mv | 0899-8256 |
| instacron_str | Universidad de Montevideo |
| institution | Universidad de Montevideo |
| instname_str | Universidad de Montevideo |
| language | eng |
| network_acronym_str | REDUM |
| network_name_str | REDUM |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:redum.um.edu.uy:20.500.12806/2640 |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| reponame_str | REDUM |
| repository.mail.fl_str_mv | nolascoaga@um.edu.uy |
| repository.name.fl_str_mv | REDUM - Universidad de Montevideo |
| repository_id_str | 10501 |
| rights_invalid_str_mv | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional Embargado http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| spelling | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 InternacionalEmbargadohttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess821e92a3-a572-48c7-a66c-5fd9aef50d316a4c7460-4261-44ad-a8ba-face254d3a7ef117db58-bcc8-4ad0-a55c-816ab5052a01Pereyra, Juan S. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay2024-10-02T18:37:02Z2024-10-02T18:37:02Z20242026-12-010899-8256https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/2640https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.012pp. 82-96application/pdfengScienceDirectGames and Economic Behavior, vol. 148, 82-96Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: when is there a trade-off?ArtículoAceptadainfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleA classic trade-off that school districts face when deciding which matching algorithm to use is that it is not possible to always respect both priorities and preferences. The student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) respects priorities but can lead to inefficient allocations. We identify a new condition on school choice markets under which DA is efficient. Our condition generalizes earlier conditions by placing restrictions on how preferences and priorities relate to one another only on the parts that are relevant for the assignment. Whenever there is a unique allocation that respects priorities, our condition captures all the environments for which DA is efficient. We show through stylized examples and simulations that our condition significantly expands the range of known environments for which DA is efficient. We also discuss how our condition sheds light on existing empirical findings.MatchingEnvyfreenessFairnessEfficiencyPrioritiesPreferencesMutually best pairs.reponame:REDUMinstname:Universidad de Montevideoinstacron:Universidad de MontevideoCantillon, EstelleChen, LiPereyra, JuanORIGINAL2212.02881v3.pdf2212.02881v3.pdfapplication/pdf849130http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/2640/1/2212.02881v3.pdf189f0c5f3000c092c7f8ce5b82ca8ecdMD51CC-LICENSElicense_rdflicense_rdfapplication/rdf+xml; charset=utf-8805http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/2640/2/license_rdf4460e5956bc1d1639be9ae6146a50347MD52LICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-82117http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/2640/3/license.txt691ed290c8bf8671811a9242b7fc04b6MD5320.500.12806/26402024-10-02 15:37:02.249oai:redum.um.edu.uy:20.500.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Universidadhttps://um.edu.uy/https://redum.um.edu.uy/oai/requestnolascoaga@um.edu.uyUruguayopendoar:105012024-10-02T18:37:02REDUM - Universidad de Montevideofalse |
| spellingShingle | Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: when is there a trade-off? Cantillon, Estelle Matching Envyfreeness Fairness Efficiency Priorities Preferences Mutually best pairs. |
| status_str | acceptedVersion |
| title | Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: when is there a trade-off? |
| title_full | Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: when is there a trade-off? |
| title_fullStr | Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: when is there a trade-off? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: when is there a trade-off? |
| title_short | Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: when is there a trade-off? |
| title_sort | Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: when is there a trade-off? |
| topic | Matching Envyfreeness Fairness Efficiency Priorities Preferences Mutually best pairs. |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/2640 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.012 |
