Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide
Resumen:
It is well known that when players have private information, vis a vis the designer, and their preferences coincide it is hard to implement the socially desirable outcome. We show that with arbitrarily small fines and arbitrarily noisy inspections, the social choice correspondence can be fully implemented (truth telling is the unique Nash equilibrium).
| 2016 | |
|
Model Pollution control |
|
| Inglés | |
| Universidad de Montevideo | |
| REDUM | |
| https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1349 | |
| Acceso abierto | |
| Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional |
| _version_ | 1807356682231087104 |
|---|---|
| author | Caffera, Marcelo |
| author2 | Dubra, Juan Figueroa, Nicolás |
| author2_role | author author |
| author_facet | Caffera, Marcelo Dubra, Juan Figueroa, Nicolás |
| author_role | author |
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| bitstream.url.fl_str_mv | http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1349/1/Mechanism_Design_when_players_preferences_and_information.pdf http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1349/2/license_rdf http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1349/3/license.txt http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1349/4/Mechanism_Design_when_players_preferences_and_information.pdf.txt http://redum.um.edu.uy/bitstream/20.500.12806/1349/5/Mechanism_Design_when_players_preferences_and_information.pdf.jpg |
| collection | REDUM |
| dc.contributor.filiacion.es.fl_str_mv | Caffera, Marcelo. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay Dubra, Juan. Universidad de Montevideo, Uruguay Figueroa, Nicolás. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv | Caffera, Marcelo Dubra, Juan Figueroa, Nicolás |
| dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv | 2022-04-22T20:38:46Z |
| dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv | 2022-04-22T20:38:46Z |
| dc.date.issued.es.fl_str_mv | 2016 |
| dc.description.abstract.none.fl_txt_mv | It is well known that when players have private information, vis a vis the designer, and their preferences coincide it is hard to implement the socially desirable outcome. We show that with arbitrarily small fines and arbitrarily noisy inspections, the social choice correspondence can be fully implemented (truth telling is the unique Nash equilibrium). |
| dc.format.extent.es.fl_str_mv | 14 p. |
| dc.format.mimetype.es.fl_str_mv | application/pdf |
| dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1349 |
| dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv | eng |
| dc.publisher.es.fl_str_mv | Universidad de Montevideo, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía, Departamento de Economía |
| dc.relation.ispartof.es.fl_str_mv | Documentos de trabajo del Departamento de Economía |
| dc.rights.es.fl_str_mv | Abierto |
| dc.rights.license.none.fl_str_mv | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional |
| dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| dc.rights.uri.*.fl_str_mv | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| dc.source.none.fl_str_mv | reponame:REDUM instname:Universidad de Montevideo instacron:Universidad de Montevideo |
| dc.subject.es.fl_str_mv | Model Pollution control |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv | Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide |
| dc.type.es.fl_str_mv | Documentos de trabajo |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
| dc.type.version.es.fl_str_mv | Publicada |
| dc.type.version.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
| description | It is well known that when players have private information, vis a vis the designer, and their preferences coincide it is hard to implement the socially desirable outcome. We show that with arbitrarily small fines and arbitrarily noisy inspections, the social choice correspondence can be fully implemented (truth telling is the unique Nash equilibrium). |
| eu_rights_str_mv | openAccess |
| format | workingPaper |
| id | REDUM_07a878b114261afd49a228258dab04ce |
| instacron_str | Universidad de Montevideo |
| institution | Universidad de Montevideo |
| instname_str | Universidad de Montevideo |
| language | eng |
| network_acronym_str | REDUM |
| network_name_str | REDUM |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:redum.um.edu.uy:20.500.12806/1349 |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| reponame_str | REDUM |
| repository.mail.fl_str_mv | nolascoaga@um.edu.uy |
| repository.name.fl_str_mv | REDUM - Universidad de Montevideo |
| repository_id_str | 10501 |
| rights_invalid_str_mv | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional Abierto http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
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| spellingShingle | Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide Caffera, Marcelo Model Pollution control |
| status_str | publishedVersion |
| title | Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide |
| title_full | Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide |
| title_fullStr | Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide |
| title_full_unstemmed | Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide |
| title_short | Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide |
| title_sort | Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide |
| topic | Model Pollution control |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1349 |
