Mechanism design when players’ preferences and information coincide
Resumen:
It is well known that when players have private information, vis a vis the designer, and their preferences coincide it is hard to implement the socially desirable outcome. We show that with arbitrarily small fines and arbitrarily noisy inspections, the social choice correspondence can be fully implemented (truth telling is the unique Nash equilibrium).
| 2016 | |
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Model Pollution control |
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| Inglés | |
| Universidad de Montevideo | |
| REDUM | |
| https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12806/1349 | |
| Acceso abierto | |
| Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional |
| Sumario: | It is well known that when players have private information, vis a vis the designer, and their preferences coincide it is hard to implement the socially desirable outcome. We show that with arbitrarily small fines and arbitrarily noisy inspections, the social choice correspondence can be fully implemented (truth telling is the unique Nash equilibrium). |
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