Ciphertext only attacks against GSM security

Cota, Eduardo

Supervisor(es): Gimenez, Eduardo - Viola, Alfredo

Resumen:

Mobile communications play a center role in today's connected society. The security of the cellular networks that connect billions of people is of the utmost importance. However, even though modern third generation and fourth generation cellular networks (3G and 4G) provide an adequate level of security in the radio interface, most networks and mobile handsets can fall back to the old GSM standard designed almost three decades ago, which has several known security weaknesses. In this work we study the security provided by the family of ciphering algoritms known as A5 that protects the radio access network of GSM, with emphasis on A5/1. We review the existing attacks against A5/1 and existing countermeasures, and show that the existing ciphertext only attacks against algorithm A5/1 [9], adapted to use the most recent Time Memory Data Tradeoff, are realistic threats to fielded GSM networks when attacked by a resourceful attacker which uses current state of the art GPUs and CPUs. We also study the existing Time Memory Data Tradeoff algorithms, extending the best known results for the Perfect Fuzzy Rainbow Tradeoff attack to the multi target case. These results allow the practitioner to calculate the parameters and tradeooff constants that best suit his application. We implemented the algorithms using parallel programming on CUDA GPUs and successfully validated the theoretical estimations. The main contributions of this work can be summarized as follows: Extending the existing best results for the Perfect Fuzzy Rainbow Tradeoff attack in the single target scenario to the multi target scenario. Validating the theoretical calculation of the parameters and tradeoff constants of the Perfect Fuzzy Rainbow tradeoff through implementation for several scenarios. Describing one of the possible procedures for the choice of parameters for the Perfect Fuzzy Rainbow tradeoff. Presenting a new ciphertext only attack against A5/1 using the voice channel in GSM communication. Calculating the details of the ciphertext only attack in [9] and showing that the attack is a realistic threat today using a perfect fuzzy rainbow tradeoff attack and modern GPUs.


Detalles Bibliográficos
2018
Telecomunicaciones
Español
Universidad de la República
COLIBRI
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/20179
Acceso abierto
Licencia Creative Commons Atribución – No Comercial – Sin Derivadas (CC - By-NC-ND)
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author Cota, Eduardo
author_facet Cota, Eduardo
author_role author
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collection COLIBRI
dc.creator.advisor.none.fl_str_mv Gimenez, Eduardo
Viola, Alfredo
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Cota, Eduardo
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2019-02-21T20:55:41Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2019-02-21T20:55:41Z
dc.date.issued.es.fl_str_mv 2018
dc.date.submitted.es.fl_str_mv 20190221
dc.description.abstract.none.fl_txt_mv Mobile communications play a center role in today's connected society. The security of the cellular networks that connect billions of people is of the utmost importance. However, even though modern third generation and fourth generation cellular networks (3G and 4G) provide an adequate level of security in the radio interface, most networks and mobile handsets can fall back to the old GSM standard designed almost three decades ago, which has several known security weaknesses. In this work we study the security provided by the family of ciphering algoritms known as A5 that protects the radio access network of GSM, with emphasis on A5/1. We review the existing attacks against A5/1 and existing countermeasures, and show that the existing ciphertext only attacks against algorithm A5/1 [9], adapted to use the most recent Time Memory Data Tradeoff, are realistic threats to fielded GSM networks when attacked by a resourceful attacker which uses current state of the art GPUs and CPUs. We also study the existing Time Memory Data Tradeoff algorithms, extending the best known results for the Perfect Fuzzy Rainbow Tradeoff attack to the multi target case. These results allow the practitioner to calculate the parameters and tradeooff constants that best suit his application. We implemented the algorithms using parallel programming on CUDA GPUs and successfully validated the theoretical estimations. The main contributions of this work can be summarized as follows: Extending the existing best results for the Perfect Fuzzy Rainbow Tradeoff attack in the single target scenario to the multi target scenario. Validating the theoretical calculation of the parameters and tradeoff constants of the Perfect Fuzzy Rainbow tradeoff through implementation for several scenarios. Describing one of the possible procedures for the choice of parameters for the Perfect Fuzzy Rainbow tradeoff. Presenting a new ciphertext only attack against A5/1 using the voice channel in GSM communication. Calculating the details of the ciphertext only attack in [9] and showing that the attack is a realistic threat today using a perfect fuzzy rainbow tradeoff attack and modern GPUs.
dc.format.mimetype.es.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.identifier.citation.es.fl_str_mv COTA, E. "Ciphertext only attacks against GSM security". Tesis de maestría, Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ingeniería, 2018.
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/20179
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv es
spa
dc.publisher.es.fl_str_mv UR. FING
dc.rights.license.none.fl_str_mv Licencia Creative Commons Atribución – No Comercial – Sin Derivadas (CC - By-NC-ND)
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:COLIBRI
instname:Universidad de la República
instacron:Universidad de la República
dc.subject.other.es.fl_str_mv Telecomunicaciones
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Ciphertext only attacks against GSM security
dc.type.es.fl_str_mv Tesis de maestría
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
dc.type.version.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
description Mobile communications play a center role in today's connected society. The security of the cellular networks that connect billions of people is of the utmost importance. However, even though modern third generation and fourth generation cellular networks (3G and 4G) provide an adequate level of security in the radio interface, most networks and mobile handsets can fall back to the old GSM standard designed almost three decades ago, which has several known security weaknesses. In this work we study the security provided by the family of ciphering algoritms known as A5 that protects the radio access network of GSM, with emphasis on A5/1. We review the existing attacks against A5/1 and existing countermeasures, and show that the existing ciphertext only attacks against algorithm A5/1 [9], adapted to use the most recent Time Memory Data Tradeoff, are realistic threats to fielded GSM networks when attacked by a resourceful attacker which uses current state of the art GPUs and CPUs. We also study the existing Time Memory Data Tradeoff algorithms, extending the best known results for the Perfect Fuzzy Rainbow Tradeoff attack to the multi target case. These results allow the practitioner to calculate the parameters and tradeooff constants that best suit his application. We implemented the algorithms using parallel programming on CUDA GPUs and successfully validated the theoretical estimations. The main contributions of this work can be summarized as follows: Extending the existing best results for the Perfect Fuzzy Rainbow Tradeoff attack in the single target scenario to the multi target scenario. Validating the theoretical calculation of the parameters and tradeoff constants of the Perfect Fuzzy Rainbow tradeoff through implementation for several scenarios. Describing one of the possible procedures for the choice of parameters for the Perfect Fuzzy Rainbow tradeoff. Presenting a new ciphertext only attack against A5/1 using the voice channel in GSM communication. Calculating the details of the ciphertext only attack in [9] and showing that the attack is a realistic threat today using a perfect fuzzy rainbow tradeoff attack and modern GPUs.
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
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identifier_str_mv COTA, E. "Ciphertext only attacks against GSM security". Tesis de maestría, Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ingeniería, 2018.
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institution Universidad de la República
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publishDate 2018
reponame_str COLIBRI
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mabel.seroubian@seciu.edu.uy
repository.name.fl_str_mv COLIBRI - Universidad de la República
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rights_invalid_str_mv Licencia Creative Commons Atribución – No Comercial – Sin Derivadas (CC - By-NC-ND)
spelling 2019-02-21T20:55:41Z2019-02-21T20:55:41Z201820190221COTA, E. "Ciphertext only attacks against GSM security". Tesis de maestría, Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ingeniería, 2018.http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/20179Mobile communications play a center role in today's connected society. The security of the cellular networks that connect billions of people is of the utmost importance. However, even though modern third generation and fourth generation cellular networks (3G and 4G) provide an adequate level of security in the radio interface, most networks and mobile handsets can fall back to the old GSM standard designed almost three decades ago, which has several known security weaknesses. In this work we study the security provided by the family of ciphering algoritms known as A5 that protects the radio access network of GSM, with emphasis on A5/1. We review the existing attacks against A5/1 and existing countermeasures, and show that the existing ciphertext only attacks against algorithm A5/1 [9], adapted to use the most recent Time Memory Data Tradeoff, are realistic threats to fielded GSM networks when attacked by a resourceful attacker which uses current state of the art GPUs and CPUs. We also study the existing Time Memory Data Tradeoff algorithms, extending the best known results for the Perfect Fuzzy Rainbow Tradeoff attack to the multi target case. These results allow the practitioner to calculate the parameters and tradeooff constants that best suit his application. We implemented the algorithms using parallel programming on CUDA GPUs and successfully validated the theoretical estimations. The main contributions of this work can be summarized as follows: Extending the existing best results for the Perfect Fuzzy Rainbow Tradeoff attack in the single target scenario to the multi target scenario. Validating the theoretical calculation of the parameters and tradeoff constants of the Perfect Fuzzy Rainbow tradeoff through implementation for several scenarios. Describing one of the possible procedures for the choice of parameters for the Perfect Fuzzy Rainbow tradeoff. Presenting a new ciphertext only attack against A5/1 using the voice channel in GSM communication. Calculating the details of the ciphertext only attack in [9] and showing that the attack is a realistic threat today using a perfect fuzzy rainbow tradeoff attack and modern GPUs.Made available in DSpace on 2019-02-21T20:55:41Z (GMT). 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spellingShingle Ciphertext only attacks against GSM security
Cota, Eduardo
Telecomunicaciones
status_str acceptedVersion
title Ciphertext only attacks against GSM security
title_full Ciphertext only attacks against GSM security
title_fullStr Ciphertext only attacks against GSM security
title_full_unstemmed Ciphertext only attacks against GSM security
title_short Ciphertext only attacks against GSM security
title_sort Ciphertext only attacks against GSM security
topic Telecomunicaciones
url http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/20179