Transfer program enforcement and children's time allocation
Resumen:
We estimate the enforcement level of conditionalities of two transfer programs and how they affect teenagers' time use, in particular, their school attendance, labor supply, and home production. We develop a structural discrete choice model in which young individuals and their parents decide how to allocate their time, including the decision of whether to attend school. They also choose how many hours to work in the market, time in home production, and leisure. To estimate the model, we use household panel data which combines administrative records and surveys covering the period of 2005-2012 in Uruguay, during which two consecutive CCT programs were introduced with different designs. Our model captures not only the share of individuals who are in fact in studies, working and those who neither study nor work, but also the share and the number of hours in market work and home production, and the GPA distribution. The policy experiments performed indicate that school attendance can be increased by raising the level of enforcement and by changing who in the household receives the cash transfer from the parents to the teenagers.
En este trabajo estimamos el nivel de enforcement de las condicionalidades de dos programas de transferencias y como afectan el uso del tiempo de los adolescentes, en particular, la asistencia a centros educativos, la oferta laboral, y las actividades domésticas. Desarrollamos un modelo estructural de elección discreta en la cual los adolescentes y sus padres eligen como asignar su tiempo, incluyendo la decisión de asistir a un centro educativo. También eligen las horas que dedican a trabajar, al ocio, y a las actividades domésticas. Para estimar el modelo usamos datos de un panel de hogares, el cual es combinado con registros administrativos y encuestas, que cubren el período 2005-2012 en Uruguay, cuando fueron introducidos dos programas CCT con diferente diseño. El modelo captura no solo la proporción de individuos que trabajan, estudian, o no hacen ninguna de las dos cosas, sino también las horas que dedican al trabajo y a las actividades domésticas, y la distribución del GPA. Los experimentos de política realizados indican que la asistencia a centros educativos podría incrementarse si el nivel de enforcement fuese mayor y si cambiara quien recibe la transferencia de ingreso, los padres o los adolescentes.
2019 | |
Time use Enforcement Discrete choice models Conditional cash transfer Uso del tiempo Transferencias condicionadas de ingreso Modelos de elección discreta ECONOMIA DOMESTICA GASTO PUBLICO SOCIAL OFERTA DE TRABAJO ADOLESCENTES |
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Inglés | |
Universidad de la República | |
COLIBRI | |
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/22362 | |
Acceso abierto | |
Licencia Creative Commons Atribución - No Comercial - Sin Derivadas (CC - By-NC-ND 4.0) |
Sumario: | We estimate the enforcement level of conditionalities of two transfer programs and how they affect teenagers' time use, in particular, their school attendance, labor supply, and home production. We develop a structural discrete choice model in which young individuals and their parents decide how to allocate their time, including the decision of whether to attend school. They also choose how many hours to work in the market, time in home production, and leisure. To estimate the model, we use household panel data which combines administrative records and surveys covering the period of 2005-2012 in Uruguay, during which two consecutive CCT programs were introduced with different designs. Our model captures not only the share of individuals who are in fact in studies, working and those who neither study nor work, but also the share and the number of hours in market work and home production, and the GPA distribution. The policy experiments performed indicate that school attendance can be increased by raising the level of enforcement and by changing who in the household receives the cash transfer from the parents to the teenagers. |
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