Does workers' control affect firm survival? : Evidence from Uruguay

Burdín, Gabriel

Resumen:

Worker-managed firms (WMFs) represent a marginal proportion of total firms and aggregate employment in most countries. The bulk of firms in real economies is ultimately controlled by capital suppliers. Different theoretical explanations suggest that WMFs are prone to failure in competitive environments. Using a panel of Uruguayan firms based on social security records and including the entire population of WMFs over the period January 1997-July 2009, I present new evidence on worker managed firms´ survival. I find that the hazard of exit is 24%-38% lower for WMFs than for conventional firms. This result is robust to alternative estimation strategies based on semi-parametric and parametric frailty duration models that impose different distributional assumptions about the shape of the baseline hazard and allow to consider firm-level unobserved heterogeneity. The evidence suggests that the marginal presence of WMFs in market economies can hardly be explained by the fact that these organizations exhibit lower survival chances than conventional firms.This paper adds to the literature on labor-managed firms, shared capitalism and to the industrial organization literature on firm survival.


Detalles Bibliográficos
2012
EMPRESAS CAPITALISTAS
AUTOGESTION DE TRABAJADORES
COOPERATIVAS
EMPLEO
Inglés
Universidad de la República
COLIBRI
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/4195
Acceso abierto
Licencia Creative Commons Atribución – No Comercial – Sin Derivadas (CC - By-NC-ND)
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author Burdín, Gabriel
author_facet Burdín, Gabriel
author_role author
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dc.coverage.spatial.es.fl_str_mv URUGUAY
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Burdín, Gabriel
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2015-03-02T17:43:17Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2015-03-02T17:43:17Z
dc.date.issued.es.fl_str_mv 2012
dc.date.submitted.es.fl_str_mv 20150225
dc.description.abstract.none.fl_txt_mv Worker-managed firms (WMFs) represent a marginal proportion of total firms and aggregate employment in most countries. The bulk of firms in real economies is ultimately controlled by capital suppliers. Different theoretical explanations suggest that WMFs are prone to failure in competitive environments. Using a panel of Uruguayan firms based on social security records and including the entire population of WMFs over the period January 1997-July 2009, I present new evidence on worker managed firms´ survival. I find that the hazard of exit is 24%-38% lower for WMFs than for conventional firms. This result is robust to alternative estimation strategies based on semi-parametric and parametric frailty duration models that impose different distributional assumptions about the shape of the baseline hazard and allow to consider firm-level unobserved heterogeneity. The evidence suggests that the marginal presence of WMFs in market economies can hardly be explained by the fact that these organizations exhibit lower survival chances than conventional firms.This paper adds to the literature on labor-managed firms, shared capitalism and to the industrial organization literature on firm survival.
dc.identifier.citation.es.fl_str_mv BURDÍN, G. "Does workers' control affect firm survival? : Evidence from Uruguay". Serie Documentos de Trabajo / FCEA-IE; DT06/12. UR.FCEA-IE, 2012.
dc.identifier.issn.es.fl_str_mv 1510-9305
1688-5090
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/4195
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv eng
dc.publisher.es.fl_str_mv UR.FCEA-IE
dc.relation.ispartof.es.fl_str_mv Serie Documentos de Trabajo / FCEA-IE; DT06/12
dc.rights.license.none.fl_str_mv Licencia Creative Commons Atribución – No Comercial – Sin Derivadas (CC - By-NC-ND)
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:COLIBRI
instname:Universidad de la República
instacron:Universidad de la República
dc.subject.es.fl_str_mv EMPRESAS CAPITALISTAS
AUTOGESTION DE TRABAJADORES
COOPERATIVAS
EMPLEO
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Does workers' control affect firm survival? : Evidence from Uruguay
dc.type.es.fl_str_mv Documento de trabajo
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
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description Worker-managed firms (WMFs) represent a marginal proportion of total firms and aggregate employment in most countries. The bulk of firms in real economies is ultimately controlled by capital suppliers. Different theoretical explanations suggest that WMFs are prone to failure in competitive environments. Using a panel of Uruguayan firms based on social security records and including the entire population of WMFs over the period January 1997-July 2009, I present new evidence on worker managed firms´ survival. I find that the hazard of exit is 24%-38% lower for WMFs than for conventional firms. This result is robust to alternative estimation strategies based on semi-parametric and parametric frailty duration models that impose different distributional assumptions about the shape of the baseline hazard and allow to consider firm-level unobserved heterogeneity. The evidence suggests that the marginal presence of WMFs in market economies can hardly be explained by the fact that these organizations exhibit lower survival chances than conventional firms.This paper adds to the literature on labor-managed firms, shared capitalism and to the industrial organization literature on firm survival.
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
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identifier_str_mv BURDÍN, G. "Does workers' control affect firm survival? : Evidence from Uruguay". Serie Documentos de Trabajo / FCEA-IE; DT06/12. UR.FCEA-IE, 2012.
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publishDate 2012
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repository.mail.fl_str_mv mabel.seroubian@seciu.edu.uy
repository.name.fl_str_mv COLIBRI - Universidad de la República
repository_id_str 4771
rights_invalid_str_mv Licencia Creative Commons Atribución – No Comercial – Sin Derivadas (CC - By-NC-ND)
spelling URUGUAY2015-03-02T17:43:17Z2015-03-02T17:43:17Z201220150225BURDÍN, G. "Does workers' control affect firm survival? : Evidence from Uruguay". Serie Documentos de Trabajo / FCEA-IE; DT06/12. UR.FCEA-IE, 2012.1510-93051688-5090http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/4195Worker-managed firms (WMFs) represent a marginal proportion of total firms and aggregate employment in most countries. The bulk of firms in real economies is ultimately controlled by capital suppliers. Different theoretical explanations suggest that WMFs are prone to failure in competitive environments. Using a panel of Uruguayan firms based on social security records and including the entire population of WMFs over the period January 1997-July 2009, I present new evidence on worker managed firms´ survival. I find that the hazard of exit is 24%-38% lower for WMFs than for conventional firms. This result is robust to alternative estimation strategies based on semi-parametric and parametric frailty duration models that impose different distributional assumptions about the shape of the baseline hazard and allow to consider firm-level unobserved heterogeneity. The evidence suggests that the marginal presence of WMFs in market economies can hardly be explained by the fact that these organizations exhibit lower survival chances than conventional firms.This paper adds to the literature on labor-managed firms, shared capitalism and to the industrial organization literature on firm survival.Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-02T17:43:17Z (GMT). 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- Universidad de la Repúblicafalse
spellingShingle Does workers' control affect firm survival? : Evidence from Uruguay
Burdín, Gabriel
EMPRESAS CAPITALISTAS
AUTOGESTION DE TRABAJADORES
COOPERATIVAS
EMPLEO
status_str publishedVersion
title Does workers' control affect firm survival? : Evidence from Uruguay
title_full Does workers' control affect firm survival? : Evidence from Uruguay
title_fullStr Does workers' control affect firm survival? : Evidence from Uruguay
title_full_unstemmed Does workers' control affect firm survival? : Evidence from Uruguay
title_short Does workers' control affect firm survival? : Evidence from Uruguay
title_sort Does workers' control affect firm survival? : Evidence from Uruguay
topic EMPRESAS CAPITALISTAS
AUTOGESTION DE TRABAJADORES
COOPERATIVAS
EMPLEO
url http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/4195