Does workers' control affect firm survival? : Evidence from Uruguay
Resumen:
Worker-managed firms (WMFs) represent a marginal proportion of total firms and aggregate employment in most countries. The bulk of firms in real economies is ultimately controlled by capital suppliers. Different theoretical explanations suggest that WMFs are prone to failure in competitive environments. Using a panel of Uruguayan firms based on social security records and including the entire population of WMFs over the period January 1997-July 2009, I present new evidence on worker managed firms´ survival. I find that the hazard of exit is 24%-38% lower for WMFs than for conventional firms. This result is robust to alternative estimation strategies based on semi-parametric and parametric frailty duration models that impose different distributional assumptions about the shape of the baseline hazard and allow to consider firm-level unobserved heterogeneity. The evidence suggests that the marginal presence of WMFs in market economies can hardly be explained by the fact that these organizations exhibit lower survival chances than conventional firms.This paper adds to the literature on labor-managed firms, shared capitalism and to the industrial organization literature on firm survival.
2012 | |
EMPRESAS CAPITALISTAS AUTOGESTION DE TRABAJADORES COOPERATIVAS EMPLEO |
|
Inglés | |
Universidad de la República | |
COLIBRI | |
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/4195 | |
Acceso abierto | |
Licencia Creative Commons Atribución – No Comercial – Sin Derivadas (CC - By-NC-ND) |
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---|---|
author | Burdín, Gabriel |
author_facet | Burdín, Gabriel |
author_role | author |
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collection | COLIBRI |
dc.coverage.spatial.es.fl_str_mv | URUGUAY |
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv | Burdín, Gabriel |
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv | 2015-03-02T17:43:17Z |
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv | 2015-03-02T17:43:17Z |
dc.date.issued.es.fl_str_mv | 2012 |
dc.date.submitted.es.fl_str_mv | 20150225 |
dc.description.abstract.none.fl_txt_mv | Worker-managed firms (WMFs) represent a marginal proportion of total firms and aggregate employment in most countries. The bulk of firms in real economies is ultimately controlled by capital suppliers. Different theoretical explanations suggest that WMFs are prone to failure in competitive environments. Using a panel of Uruguayan firms based on social security records and including the entire population of WMFs over the period January 1997-July 2009, I present new evidence on worker managed firms´ survival. I find that the hazard of exit is 24%-38% lower for WMFs than for conventional firms. This result is robust to alternative estimation strategies based on semi-parametric and parametric frailty duration models that impose different distributional assumptions about the shape of the baseline hazard and allow to consider firm-level unobserved heterogeneity. The evidence suggests that the marginal presence of WMFs in market economies can hardly be explained by the fact that these organizations exhibit lower survival chances than conventional firms.This paper adds to the literature on labor-managed firms, shared capitalism and to the industrial organization literature on firm survival. |
dc.identifier.citation.es.fl_str_mv | BURDÍN, G. "Does workers' control affect firm survival? : Evidence from Uruguay". Serie Documentos de Trabajo / FCEA-IE; DT06/12. UR.FCEA-IE, 2012. |
dc.identifier.issn.es.fl_str_mv | 1510-9305 1688-5090 |
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/4195 |
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv | eng |
dc.publisher.es.fl_str_mv | UR.FCEA-IE |
dc.relation.ispartof.es.fl_str_mv | Serie Documentos de Trabajo / FCEA-IE; DT06/12 |
dc.rights.license.none.fl_str_mv | Licencia Creative Commons Atribución – No Comercial – Sin Derivadas (CC - By-NC-ND) |
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv | reponame:COLIBRI instname:Universidad de la República instacron:Universidad de la República |
dc.subject.es.fl_str_mv | EMPRESAS CAPITALISTAS AUTOGESTION DE TRABAJADORES COOPERATIVAS EMPLEO |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv | Does workers' control affect firm survival? : Evidence from Uruguay |
dc.type.es.fl_str_mv | Documento de trabajo |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.type.version.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
description | Worker-managed firms (WMFs) represent a marginal proportion of total firms and aggregate employment in most countries. The bulk of firms in real economies is ultimately controlled by capital suppliers. Different theoretical explanations suggest that WMFs are prone to failure in competitive environments. Using a panel of Uruguayan firms based on social security records and including the entire population of WMFs over the period January 1997-July 2009, I present new evidence on worker managed firms´ survival. I find that the hazard of exit is 24%-38% lower for WMFs than for conventional firms. This result is robust to alternative estimation strategies based on semi-parametric and parametric frailty duration models that impose different distributional assumptions about the shape of the baseline hazard and allow to consider firm-level unobserved heterogeneity. The evidence suggests that the marginal presence of WMFs in market economies can hardly be explained by the fact that these organizations exhibit lower survival chances than conventional firms.This paper adds to the literature on labor-managed firms, shared capitalism and to the industrial organization literature on firm survival. |
eu_rights_str_mv | openAccess |
format | workingPaper |
id | COLIBRI_9fd71cbdf582f22444f9560f8cd97c06 |
identifier_str_mv | BURDÍN, G. "Does workers' control affect firm survival? : Evidence from Uruguay". Serie Documentos de Trabajo / FCEA-IE; DT06/12. UR.FCEA-IE, 2012. 1510-9305 1688-5090 |
instacron_str | Universidad de la República |
institution | Universidad de la República |
instname_str | Universidad de la República |
language | eng |
network_acronym_str | COLIBRI |
network_name_str | COLIBRI |
oai_identifier_str | oai:colibri.udelar.edu.uy:20.500.12008/4195 |
publishDate | 2012 |
reponame_str | COLIBRI |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv | mabel.seroubian@seciu.edu.uy |
repository.name.fl_str_mv | COLIBRI - Universidad de la República |
repository_id_str | 4771 |
rights_invalid_str_mv | Licencia Creative Commons Atribución – No Comercial – Sin Derivadas (CC - By-NC-ND) |
spelling | URUGUAY2015-03-02T17:43:17Z2015-03-02T17:43:17Z201220150225BURDÍN, G. "Does workers' control affect firm survival? : Evidence from Uruguay". Serie Documentos de Trabajo / FCEA-IE; DT06/12. UR.FCEA-IE, 2012.1510-93051688-5090http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/4195Worker-managed firms (WMFs) represent a marginal proportion of total firms and aggregate employment in most countries. The bulk of firms in real economies is ultimately controlled by capital suppliers. Different theoretical explanations suggest that WMFs are prone to failure in competitive environments. Using a panel of Uruguayan firms based on social security records and including the entire population of WMFs over the period January 1997-July 2009, I present new evidence on worker managed firms´ survival. I find that the hazard of exit is 24%-38% lower for WMFs than for conventional firms. This result is robust to alternative estimation strategies based on semi-parametric and parametric frailty duration models that impose different distributional assumptions about the shape of the baseline hazard and allow to consider firm-level unobserved heterogeneity. The evidence suggests that the marginal presence of WMFs in market economies can hardly be explained by the fact that these organizations exhibit lower survival chances than conventional firms.This paper adds to the literature on labor-managed firms, shared capitalism and to the industrial organization literature on firm survival.Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-02T17:43:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 5 license.txt: 4244 bytes, checksum: 528b6a3c8c7d0c6e28129d576e989607 (MD5) license_text: 21936 bytes, checksum: 9833653f73f7853880c94a6fead477b1 (MD5) license_url: 49 bytes, checksum: 4afdbb8c545fd630ea7db775da747b2f (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) dt-06-12.pdf: 269573 bytes, checksum: 818c03828a58ad77a96ce12f8692414a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012engUR.FCEA-IESerie Documentos de Trabajo / FCEA-IE; DT06/12Las obras depositadas en el Repositorio se rigen por la Ordenanza de los Derechos de la Propiedad Intelectual de la Universidad De La República. (Res. Nº 91 de C.D.C. de 8/III/1994 – D.O. 7/IV/1994) y por la Ordenanza del Repositorio Abierto de la Universidad de la República (Res. Nº 16 de C.D.C. de 07/10/2014)info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessLicencia Creative Commons Atribución – No Comercial – Sin Derivadas (CC - By-NC-ND)EMPRESAS CAPITALISTASAUTOGESTION DE TRABAJADORESCOOPERATIVASEMPLEODoes workers' control affect firm survival? : Evidence from UruguayDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionreponame:COLIBRIinstname:Universidad de la Repúblicainstacron:Universidad de la RepúblicaBurdín, 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- Universidad de la Repúblicafalse |
spellingShingle | Does workers' control affect firm survival? : Evidence from Uruguay Burdín, Gabriel EMPRESAS CAPITALISTAS AUTOGESTION DE TRABAJADORES COOPERATIVAS EMPLEO |
status_str | publishedVersion |
title | Does workers' control affect firm survival? : Evidence from Uruguay |
title_full | Does workers' control affect firm survival? : Evidence from Uruguay |
title_fullStr | Does workers' control affect firm survival? : Evidence from Uruguay |
title_full_unstemmed | Does workers' control affect firm survival? : Evidence from Uruguay |
title_short | Does workers' control affect firm survival? : Evidence from Uruguay |
title_sort | Does workers' control affect firm survival? : Evidence from Uruguay |
topic | EMPRESAS CAPITALISTAS AUTOGESTION DE TRABAJADORES COOPERATIVAS EMPLEO |
url | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/4195 |