Tolerance of tax evasion
Resumen:
We present a formal model in which individuals want the government to tolerate tax evasion because, in the context of limited state capacity, evasion provides insurance. Preferred tolerance of tax evasion increases with income, because government programs are also redistributive. We take the model to the data using the World Values Survey. We show that both in the model and in the WVS data justification of tax evasion is increasing in individuals’ income, presents an inverted-U shape in perceived risk and is decreasing in institutional quality. Our analysis suggests that strong tax enforcement might not be popular among many citizens, particularly so in weak institutional environments
| 2016 | |
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IMPUESTOS EVASION TRIBUTARIA DESARROLLO ECONOMICO |
|
| Inglés | |
| Universidad de la República | |
| COLIBRI | |
| http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/10722 | |
| Acceso abierto | |
| Licencia Creative Commons Atribución – No Comercial – Sin Derivadas (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) |
| _version_ | 1807523143623901184 |
|---|---|
| author | Forteza, Alvaro |
| author2 | Noboa, Cecilia |
| author2_role | author |
| author_facet | Forteza, Alvaro Noboa, Cecilia |
| author_role | author |
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| collection | COLIBRI |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv | Forteza, Alvaro Noboa, Cecilia |
| dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv | 2017-12-15T14:31:25Z |
| dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv | 2017-12-15T14:31:25Z |
| dc.date.issued.es.fl_str_mv | 2016 |
| dc.date.submitted.es.fl_str_mv | 20171213 |
| dc.description.abstract.none.fl_txt_mv | We present a formal model in which individuals want the government to tolerate tax evasion because, in the context of limited state capacity, evasion provides insurance. Preferred tolerance of tax evasion increases with income, because government programs are also redistributive. We take the model to the data using the World Values Survey. We show that both in the model and in the WVS data justification of tax evasion is increasing in individuals’ income, presents an inverted-U shape in perceived risk and is decreasing in institutional quality. Our analysis suggests that strong tax enforcement might not be popular among many citizens, particularly so in weak institutional environments |
| dc.format.mimetype.es.fl_str_mv | application/pdf |
| dc.identifier.citation.es.fl_str_mv | Forteza, A., Noboa, C. "Tolerance of tax evasion". XV Jornadas de Investigación : el oficio del investigador en Ciencias Sociales [en linea]. 2016 |
| dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/10722 |
| dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv | en eng |
| dc.publisher.es.fl_str_mv | Udelar. FCS |
| dc.relation.ispartof.es.fl_str_mv | XV Jornadas de Investigación : el oficio del investigador en Ciencias Sociales |
| dc.rights.license.none.fl_str_mv | Licencia Creative Commons Atribución – No Comercial – Sin Derivadas (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) |
| dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| dc.source.none.fl_str_mv | reponame:COLIBRI instname:Universidad de la República instacron:Universidad de la República |
| dc.subject.other.es.fl_str_mv | IMPUESTOS EVASION TRIBUTARIA DESARROLLO ECONOMICO |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv | Tolerance of tax evasion |
| dc.type.es.fl_str_mv | Ponencia |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject |
| dc.type.version.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
| description | We present a formal model in which individuals want the government to tolerate tax evasion because, in the context of limited state capacity, evasion provides insurance. Preferred tolerance of tax evasion increases with income, because government programs are also redistributive. We take the model to the data using the World Values Survey. We show that both in the model and in the WVS data justification of tax evasion is increasing in individuals’ income, presents an inverted-U shape in perceived risk and is decreasing in institutional quality. Our analysis suggests that strong tax enforcement might not be popular among many citizens, particularly so in weak institutional environments |
| eu_rights_str_mv | openAccess |
| format | conferenceObject |
| id | COLIBRI_2cba9ad9bed1150f6b99e19a346d2b35 |
| identifier_str_mv | Forteza, A., Noboa, C. "Tolerance of tax evasion". XV Jornadas de Investigación : el oficio del investigador en Ciencias Sociales [en linea]. 2016 |
| instacron_str | Universidad de la República |
| institution | Universidad de la República |
| instname_str | Universidad de la República |
| language | eng |
| language_invalid_str_mv | en |
| network_acronym_str | COLIBRI |
| network_name_str | COLIBRI |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:colibri.udelar.edu.uy:20.500.12008/10722 |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| reponame_str | COLIBRI |
| repository.mail.fl_str_mv | mabel.seroubian@seciu.edu.uy |
| repository.name.fl_str_mv | COLIBRI - Universidad de la República |
| repository_id_str | 4771 |
| rights_invalid_str_mv | Licencia Creative Commons Atribución – No Comercial – Sin Derivadas (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) |
| spelling | 2017-12-15T14:31:25Z2017-12-15T14:31:25Z201620171213Forteza, A., Noboa, C. "Tolerance of tax evasion". XV Jornadas de Investigación : el oficio del investigador en Ciencias Sociales [en linea]. 2016http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/10722We present a formal model in which individuals want the government to tolerate tax evasion because, in the context of limited state capacity, evasion provides insurance. Preferred tolerance of tax evasion increases with income, because government programs are also redistributive. We take the model to the data using the World Values Survey. We show that both in the model and in the WVS data justification of tax evasion is increasing in individuals’ income, presents an inverted-U shape in perceived risk and is decreasing in institutional quality. Our analysis suggests that strong tax enforcement might not be popular among many citizens, particularly so in weak institutional environmentsMade available in DSpace on 2017-12-15T14:31:25Z (GMT). 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- Universidad de la Repúblicafalse |
| spellingShingle | Tolerance of tax evasion Forteza, Alvaro IMPUESTOS EVASION TRIBUTARIA DESARROLLO ECONOMICO |
| status_str | publishedVersion |
| title | Tolerance of tax evasion |
| title_full | Tolerance of tax evasion |
| title_fullStr | Tolerance of tax evasion |
| title_full_unstemmed | Tolerance of tax evasion |
| title_short | Tolerance of tax evasion |
| title_sort | Tolerance of tax evasion |
| topic | IMPUESTOS EVASION TRIBUTARIA DESARROLLO ECONOMICO |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/10722 |
