Unemployment insurance design and its effects : evidence from the uruguayan case
Resumen:
Abundant empirical evidence both for developed and developing countries finds that the design of the unemployment insurance program may have important consequences on labor market outcomes. In particular, the design of UI system can affect both unemployment duration and employment outcomes. Recent changes in the design of the Uruguayan UI have implied modifications that may alter various labor market outcomes. In particular, we assess the impacts of the following modifications: the duration of UI was reduced from six to four months in the case of temporary laid off workers (suspension); the scheme of payments was changed for permanent laid off workers (job loss). Instead of a lump sum during six months, a decreasing scheme of payments was installed; and the duration of the UI can be extended up to one year for workers 50 or older.
| 2012 | |
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MERCADO DE TRABAJO DESEMPLEO SEGURO DE DESEMPLEO EVALUACION |
|
| Inglés | |
| Universidad de la República | |
| COLIBRI | |
| http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/4261 | |
| Acceso abierto | |
| Licencia Creative Commons Atribución – No Comercial – Sin Derivadas (CC - By-NC-ND) |
| _version_ | 1807523134949031936 |
|---|---|
| author | Amarante, Verónica |
| author2 | Arim, Rodrigo Dean, Andrés |
| author2_role | author author |
| author_facet | Amarante, Verónica Arim, Rodrigo Dean, Andrés |
| author_role | author |
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| collection | COLIBRI |
| dc.coverage.spatial.es.fl_str_mv | URUGUAY |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv | Amarante, Verónica Arim, Rodrigo Dean, Andrés |
| dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv | 2015-03-02T17:43:56Z |
| dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv | 2015-03-02T17:43:56Z |
| dc.date.issued.es.fl_str_mv | 2012 |
| dc.date.submitted.es.fl_str_mv | 20150225 |
| dc.description.abstract.none.fl_txt_mv | Abundant empirical evidence both for developed and developing countries finds that the design of the unemployment insurance program may have important consequences on labor market outcomes. In particular, the design of UI system can affect both unemployment duration and employment outcomes. Recent changes in the design of the Uruguayan UI have implied modifications that may alter various labor market outcomes. In particular, we assess the impacts of the following modifications: the duration of UI was reduced from six to four months in the case of temporary laid off workers (suspension); the scheme of payments was changed for permanent laid off workers (job loss). Instead of a lump sum during six months, a decreasing scheme of payments was installed; and the duration of the UI can be extended up to one year for workers 50 or older. |
| dc.identifier.citation.es.fl_str_mv | AMARANTE, V., ARIM, R., DEAN, A. "Unemployment insurance design and its effects : evidence from the uruguayan case". Serie Documentos de Trabajo / FCEA-IE; DT09/12. UR.FCEA-IE, 2012. |
| dc.identifier.issn.es.fl_str_mv | 1510-9305 1688-5090 |
| dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/4261 |
| dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv | eng |
| dc.publisher.es.fl_str_mv | UR.FCEA-IE |
| dc.relation.ispartof.es.fl_str_mv | Serie Documentos de Trabajo / FCEA-IE; DT09/12 |
| dc.rights.license.none.fl_str_mv | Licencia Creative Commons Atribución – No Comercial – Sin Derivadas (CC - By-NC-ND) |
| dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| dc.source.none.fl_str_mv | reponame:COLIBRI instname:Universidad de la República instacron:Universidad de la República |
| dc.subject.es.fl_str_mv | MERCADO DE TRABAJO DESEMPLEO SEGURO DE DESEMPLEO EVALUACION |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv | Unemployment insurance design and its effects : evidence from the uruguayan case |
| dc.type.es.fl_str_mv | Documento de trabajo |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
| dc.type.version.none.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
| description | Abundant empirical evidence both for developed and developing countries finds that the design of the unemployment insurance program may have important consequences on labor market outcomes. In particular, the design of UI system can affect both unemployment duration and employment outcomes. Recent changes in the design of the Uruguayan UI have implied modifications that may alter various labor market outcomes. In particular, we assess the impacts of the following modifications: the duration of UI was reduced from six to four months in the case of temporary laid off workers (suspension); the scheme of payments was changed for permanent laid off workers (job loss). Instead of a lump sum during six months, a decreasing scheme of payments was installed; and the duration of the UI can be extended up to one year for workers 50 or older. |
| eu_rights_str_mv | openAccess |
| format | workingPaper |
| id | COLIBRI_016750250b8a21a12f61eae02d349a63 |
| identifier_str_mv | AMARANTE, V., ARIM, R., DEAN, A. "Unemployment insurance design and its effects : evidence from the uruguayan case". Serie Documentos de Trabajo / FCEA-IE; DT09/12. UR.FCEA-IE, 2012. 1510-9305 1688-5090 |
| instacron_str | Universidad de la República |
| institution | Universidad de la República |
| instname_str | Universidad de la República |
| language | eng |
| network_acronym_str | COLIBRI |
| network_name_str | COLIBRI |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:colibri.udelar.edu.uy:20.500.12008/4261 |
| publishDate | 2012 |
| reponame_str | COLIBRI |
| repository.mail.fl_str_mv | mabel.seroubian@seciu.edu.uy |
| repository.name.fl_str_mv | COLIBRI - Universidad de la República |
| repository_id_str | 4771 |
| rights_invalid_str_mv | Licencia Creative Commons Atribución – No Comercial – Sin Derivadas (CC - By-NC-ND) |
| spelling | URUGUAY2015-03-02T17:43:56Z2015-03-02T17:43:56Z201220150225AMARANTE, V., ARIM, R., DEAN, A. "Unemployment insurance design and its effects : evidence from the uruguayan case". Serie Documentos de Trabajo / FCEA-IE; DT09/12. UR.FCEA-IE, 2012.1510-93051688-5090http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/4261Abundant empirical evidence both for developed and developing countries finds that the design of the unemployment insurance program may have important consequences on labor market outcomes. In particular, the design of UI system can affect both unemployment duration and employment outcomes. Recent changes in the design of the Uruguayan UI have implied modifications that may alter various labor market outcomes. In particular, we assess the impacts of the following modifications: the duration of UI was reduced from six to four months in the case of temporary laid off workers (suspension); the scheme of payments was changed for permanent laid off workers (job loss). Instead of a lump sum during six months, a decreasing scheme of payments was installed; and the duration of the UI can be extended up to one year for workers 50 or older.Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-02T17:43:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 5 license.txt: 4244 bytes, checksum: 528b6a3c8c7d0c6e28129d576e989607 (MD5) license_text: 21936 bytes, checksum: 9833653f73f7853880c94a6fead477b1 (MD5) license_url: 49 bytes, checksum: 4afdbb8c545fd630ea7db775da747b2f (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) dt-09-12.pdf: 3537852 bytes, checksum: 973795e417f14a8d7d7d64bda2f1fb92 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012engUR.FCEA-IESerie Documentos de Trabajo / FCEA-IE; DT09/12Las obras depositadas en el Repositorio se rigen por la Ordenanza de los Derechos de la Propiedad Intelectual de la Universidad De La República. (Res. Nº 91 de C.D.C. de 8/III/1994 – D.O. 7/IV/1994) y por la Ordenanza del Repositorio Abierto de la Universidad de la República (Res. Nº 16 de C.D.C. de 07/10/2014)info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessLicencia Creative Commons Atribución – No Comercial – Sin Derivadas (CC - By-NC-ND)MERCADO DE TRABAJODESEMPLEOSEGURO DE DESEMPLEOEVALUACIONUnemployment insurance design and its effects : evidence from the uruguayan caseDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionreponame:COLIBRIinstname:Universidad de la Repúblicainstacron:Universidad de la RepúblicaAmarante, VerónicaArim, RodrigoDean, 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- Universidad de la Repúblicafalse |
| spellingShingle | Unemployment insurance design and its effects : evidence from the uruguayan case Amarante, Verónica MERCADO DE TRABAJO DESEMPLEO SEGURO DE DESEMPLEO EVALUACION |
| status_str | publishedVersion |
| title | Unemployment insurance design and its effects : evidence from the uruguayan case |
| title_full | Unemployment insurance design and its effects : evidence from the uruguayan case |
| title_fullStr | Unemployment insurance design and its effects : evidence from the uruguayan case |
| title_full_unstemmed | Unemployment insurance design and its effects : evidence from the uruguayan case |
| title_short | Unemployment insurance design and its effects : evidence from the uruguayan case |
| title_sort | Unemployment insurance design and its effects : evidence from the uruguayan case |
| topic | MERCADO DE TRABAJO DESEMPLEO SEGURO DE DESEMPLEO EVALUACION |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/4261 |
